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DOCTRINAL COLLAPSE IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY: THE EMPTY SHELL OF
FAILURE TO WARN
JAMES

A.

AARON

HENDERSON, JR.*

D.

TWERsKI**

Liabilityfor a manufacturer'sfailure to warn ofproduct-relatedrisks is a well-established feature of modern products liability law, Yet many serious doctrinaland conceptual problems underlie these claims. Professors Henderson and -ersfki explore
theseproblems andargue thatfailure-to-warnjurisprudenceis confused. perhaps irreparably, and that this confusion often results in the imposition of excessive liability on
manufacturers. The authors begin by exposing basic errorsresultingfrom courts' confusion over whether to apply a strict liabilityor a negligencestandardof care infailureto-warn cases. Having determined that negligence is the appropriatestandard they
then examine more substantialandintractabledifflculties infailure-to-warnlitigation,
particularlythe inability ofjuries to considerthe marginalcosts and benefits of adding
warnings to those alreadyprovided The authors conclude thatfairnessand efficiency
goals of products liability law would be better served if judges were to take a more
active role in screening out marginalfailure-to-warn claims.
INTRODUCTION

Negligence dominates tort. Since courts first recognized the general
duty of care in the mid-nineteenth century,I cases of all types have been
tailored to fit the fault-based formula. Activities as diverse as automobile

driving,2 medical care provision, 3 and land management 4 are securely en* Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B., 1959, Princeton University; LL.B., 1962, LL.M., 1964, Harvard University.
** Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School A.B., 1962, Beth Medrash Elyon Research
Institute; B.S., 1970, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D., 1965, Marquette University.
I The major works detailing the development of early American tort law are L Friedman,
A History of American Tort Law (2d ed. 1985); M. Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law (1977); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L Rev. 359
(1951); Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L Rev. 641 (1989);
Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nimeteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation,
90 Yale LJ. 1717 (1981).
2 Notwithstanding the argument that a large number of automobile accidents are not
fault-based but are rather the product of split-second decisionmaking in a hostile environment,
negligence remains the dominant mode for litigating such cases. See, eg., 3 F. Harper, F.
James & 0. Gray, The Law of Torts §§ 11.4, 12.4 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter The Law of
Torts]; R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim 15-22 (1965);
Ehrenzweig, "Full-Aid" Insurance for the Traffic Victim-A Voluntary Compensation Plan,
43 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1955); McNiece & Thornton, Automobile Accident Prevention and
Compensation, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 585, 604-05 (1952). The no-fault revolt of the 1970s never
replaced the fault-based system in its entirety in any jurisdiction. More than half the states
have not bought into even modest reform.
3 The case-by-case negligence litigation system continues for medical care cases, although
265
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sconced in negligence doctrine. With the advent of modem American

products liability law three decades ago, 5 the traditional elements of negligence were quickly assimilated into the case law.6 This Article argues
that deep and disturbing doctrinal problems exist with regard to a major

category of negligence litigation-products cases involving failures to
warn. Commercial distributors of products owe users and consumers a

duty to warn of product-related risks that are not obvious. Failure to
warn when a reasonable person would have warned exposes defendants
to tort liability, as do other forms of unreasonably risky conduct in a
negligence regime. In contrast to other areas of tort, however, the prestrong arguments have been made for at least partial replacement by a system which compensates for a pre-defined list of adverse consequences. See ABA Comm'n on Medical Professional Liability, Designated Compensable Event System: A Feasibility Study 49-51, 77-79
(1979); Henderson, The Boundary Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 Md. L. Rev. 659, 66873 (1982); Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alternative, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 277, 28083 (Spring 1986).
Negligence law also governs the cause of action for informed consent, although numerous
commentators have argued that it is in truth a dignitary tort. See, e.g., Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 137, 143-47 (1977); Schultz, From
Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 Yale L.J. 219, 226-29
(1985).
4 In the case of landowner liability, traditional limited duty rules have been abandoned in
many jurisdictions in favor of the all-purpose negligence formula. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 119, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968); Mile High Fence Co.
v. Rodovich, 175 Colo. 537, 546-47, 489 P.2d 308, 313-14 (1971); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d
233, 240-41, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568 (1976). The inexorable march of
negligence doctrine swept away traditional rules limiting liability to adult trespassers as well as
licensees and invitees. See 4 The Law of Torts, supra note 2, § 27.1-.2.
5 By abolishing privity, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 413-17, 161
A.2d 69, 99-102 (1960), set the stage for the adoption of § 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts in 1964. Two articles by the late Dean Prosser chronicle the historic changes. See
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966).
6 The traditional common law concepts of duty, standard of care, cause-in-fact, proximate
cause, and contributory fault became part of products litigation. For an extensive discussion
of the role of duty in products liability, see Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between
Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the
Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 521 (1982). Standard of care or standard of product quality
is basically governed by the risk-utility standard. See authorities cited in note 23 infra.
Cause-in-fact is governed by the self-same hypothetical sine qua non rule which governs
negligence actions. See Haragan v. Union Oil Co., 312 F. Supp. 1392, 1395 (D. Alaska 1970);
Steward v. Von Solbrig Hosp., Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 599, 603, 321 N.E.2d 428, 431-32 (1974);
Midwestern V.W. Corp. v. Ringley, 503 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Ky. 1973); W. Prosser, The Law of
Torts § 103 (5th ed. 1971). Proximate cause continues as a liability-limiting concept. See W.
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 102, at
711 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton]. With regard to contributory fault, there is
some controversy as to whether it should be an affirmative defense. However, a strong majority of courts apply comparative fault in products cases. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978); Coney v.
J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Il. 2d 104, 116, 454 N.E.2d 197, 202 (1983); V. Schwartz, Comparative
Negligence § 12.2 (1986); H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 14.42-.47 (1987).
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cast negligence standards are inadequate for the tasks to which they have
been assigned. The doctrine purporting to govern these cases has collapsed upon itself. To reestablish coherence, significant changes are necessary; fine-tuning will not suffice. Whatever must be done to set things
right, the first step is to understand the problem. Meaningful changes in
decisionmaking can only occur if policy makers, including judges, are
made sensitive to the need for change.
Focusing on failure to warn may strike some followers of products
liability as strange. Given the comparatively greater attention paid by
commentators recently to liability for defective product designs, 7 one
might assume that failure to warn is a relatively problem-free area of law.
Design cases present difficult issues, and we have no quarrel with those
who have focused on them.8 But notwithstanding the attention paid to
design litigation, at this stage in the development of products liability,
failure to warn presents more serious doctrinal difficulties. Given the
analytical confusion we identify in this Article, it is clear that defendants
cannot pattern their responsive behavior in ways that optimize the relevant levels of product safety. Thus, the time is overdue to take a hard,
critical look at an area that many seem to have assumed to be relatively
problem free. 9 We are motivated to do so not only because we perceive
the theoretical underpinnings of the failure-to-warn doctrine to be unsound, but for intensely practical reasons as well. Far too many frivolous
failure-to-warn cases survive appellate review. The absence of principled
standards has fostered an atmosphere of lawlessness. Even the powerful
tort reform movement of the past decade has had little effect on reversing
the decisional patterns in failure-to-warn cases.
To understand the nature of the difficulties with failure-to-warn doctrine, we contrast it with defective-design litigation. With respect to allegedly defective product designs, commentators and courts have come
to recognize that, given the interdependence of risk-utility factors such as
See authorities cited in note 23 infra.
8 Indeed both of the authors have written extensively on the difficulties which attend design litigation. See Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept- Retreat from the Rule of
Law, 51 Ind. LJ. 467 (1976) [hereinafter Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept];
Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531 (1973) [hereinafter Henderson, Judicial Review of Design
Choices]; Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Pieher, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability:
From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 347 (1980) [hereinafter Twerski, Shifting Perspectives]; Twerski, supra note 6.
9 In an early piece, one of the authors noted that warning litigation may present complex
litigation problems. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 Cornell L Rev. 495
(1976) [hereinafter Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings]. For an early perceptive critique of failure-to-wam doctrine, see R. Epstein, Modem Products Liability Law 93-118
7

(1980).
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product function, aesthetics, durability, maintenance, and safety, the task

of weighing such factors tests the limits of adjudication. 10 Forced to
evaluate alternative design possibilities by attaching values to such factors, and realizing that the values shift and change as the factors are
rearranged in varying combinations, courts are tempted to give up the
struggle and send most design cases to juries to decide on vague instruc-

tions. Responding to these difficulties in application, commentators,"
and courts 12-and

recently legislatures 13-have

adjusted the doctrinal

10 See authorities cited in note 8 supra. Numerous courts have recognized the difficulties
that attend design litigation. See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962-63 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Knipper v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 999
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 241 & n. 12 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74, 79-81 & nn. 1-4, 268 N.W.2d 291,
294 & nn. 1-4 (1978); Brown v. United States Stove, 98 N.J. 155, 175-83, 484 A.2d 1234, 124549 (1984) (Schrieber, J., concurring); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 326,
364 N.E.2d 267, 273 (1977); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 66-67, 577 P.2d 1322,
1327-28 (1978); Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., 515 Pa. 334, 346-47, 528 A.2d 590, 596 (1987)
(Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
I See Fischer, Products Liability-Functionally Imposed Strict Liability, 32 Okla. L. Rev.
93, 114-16 (1979); Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 625, 630-32 (1978) [hereinafter Henderson, Proposed
Statutory Reform]; Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 773, 773-81
(1979) [hereinafter Henderson, Defective Product Design]; Schwartz, Foreward: Understanding Products Liability, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 435, 464-93 (1979); Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. Mich.
J.L. Ref. 575, 580-610 (1985); Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability,
33 Vand. L. Rev. 551, 566-75 (1980).
12 See Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 741 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Colo. 1987); Troja v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 107-09, 488 A.2d 516, 518-19 (1985); Prentis v.
Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 689-91, 365 N.W.2d 176, 185-86 (1984); Kallio v. Ford Motor
Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 94-96 (Minn. 1987); Macri v. Ames McDonough Co., 211 N.J. Super.
636, 639-41, 512 A.2d 548, 550-51 (1986); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844,
847 (Tex. 1979).
13 Many jurisdictions have passed "state-of-art" statutes which bar recovery when defendants can show that their product designs conformed to the best available technology known at
the time of distribution. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-683.1 (1982); Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 16-116-104 (1979); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(a) (1977); Idaho Code § 6-1406 (1980); Ind.
Code § 33-1-1.5-4 (1982); Iowa Code § 668.12 (1986); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3307 (1986); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.310(2) (Baldwin 1979 & Supp. 1984); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.59
(West 1988); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2946(3) (1978); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21, 182 (1978);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:4 (1988); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-1.3.a.(I) (West 1987); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.75(F) (Page's Supp. 1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105(o) (1978);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.72.050 (Supp. 1985). Section 203(c)(1) of the proposed Uniform
Product Safety Act of 1988 (proposed draft 1988) also provides for a state-of-art defense.
Several states provide that compliance with governmental standards creates a presumption of nondefectiveness. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(b) (1977); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-3304 (1981); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.1-05(3) (1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-104
(1978). Over 25 states have passed legislation limiting punitive damages. For a listing of these
states, see J. Henderson & A. Twerski, Products Liability: Problems and Process 57-59 (Supp.
1989). These statutes are of particular significance in design litigation because design cases are
highly vulnerable to punitive damage claims. See Owens, Problems in Assessing Punitive
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bases of liability to make design cases more adjudicable. Whether these
efforts have succeeded is debatable.1 4 But few observers seriously question the premise that workable solutions will come, sooner or later, from
appropriate adjustments in the controlling doctrine.1 5
In contrast, the failure-to-warn claim has all but escaped searching
analysis. A flurry of commentary' 6 did follow the decision of a major
state appellate court which held that a manufacturer could be liable for
failing to warn about a risk that was scientifically unknowable at the time
the product was marketed.1 7 And recently, several writers have complained that it is too easy to make out a prima facie failure-to-warn
case.1 8 But generally the unspoken assumption is that the all-purpose
negligence formula works well in failure-to-warn cases.
The perception that all is well is fueled by the unique character of
failure-to-warn claims. With allegedly defective designs, defendants
often can show that an alternative design suggested by the plaintiff would
have made things worse, and therefore courts hearing design cases must
conduct elaborate cost-benefit analyses to test these claims. By contrast,

in failure-to-warn cases the common assumption is that warnings can
Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. Clii. L Rev. 1, 11 (1982).
14 Some observers question the ability of the tort reform movement to make a significant
impact on the excesses of the present litigation system. See, e.g., Epstein, The Risks of Risk/
Utility, 98 Ohio St. L.J 469 (1987) (arguing that risk-utility is hopelessly open-ended); Priest,
The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 Yale L. 1521, 1587-90 (1987) (questioning long-term effectiveness of current tort law reform); Rabin, Some Reflections on the
Process of Tort Reform, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 13, 42-43 (1988) (arguing that substantive law
reform is not likely to be significant); Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A
Rational Response to the Critics, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1125, 1133-34 (1989) (arguing that
structure of tort liability system resists legislative change).
15 The authors, who have been among the sharpest critics of open-ended design litigation.
believe that design litigation has begun to come into focus. See authorities cited in note 11
supra. The belief that design litigation would ultimately come under firm judicial control has
been confirmed by a recent empirical study. See Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L Rev. 479
(1990). For a description of this study, see notes 194-95 infra.
16 See, eg., Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. Legal Stud. 517 (1984); Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Products
Liability, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 919 (1981); Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 853 (1983); Schwartz, Products Liability,
Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship,
14 J. Legal Stud. 689 (1985).
17 See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 202-04,447 A.2d 539, 545-46
(1982).
18 See, e.g., R. Epstein, supra note 9, at 93; P. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and
Its Consequences 51-58 (1988); Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in Liability: Perspectives and Policy, at 217-20 (R. Litan & C. Winston eds. 1988); Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L.J. 353, 398 (1988);
Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of
the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability, at 32 n.25 (February 1986) (on
file at New York University Law Review).
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often be improved upon but can never be made worse; that is, the issue at
stake is always whether the defendant ought to have supplied consumers
with more, and by definition better, information about product risks. 19
Whether the defendant should have supplied more information seems,
therefore, an intuitively manageable, eminently adjudicable question.
The problems in the failure-to-warn area, if there be any, seem capable of
20
being solved by marginal adjustments of judicial standards.
We believe, however, that the shared wisdom regarding the negligence standard in failure-to-warn cases overlooks two serious flaws.
First, there are doctrinal confusions that result from some courts' misguided attempts to distinguish (and apply) a strict liability cause of action for failure to warn. These confusions, which inhibit the law from
reaching its objectives, need to be eliminated. Likening these doctrinal
problems to weeds in a garden, Part I urges courts or legislatures to pull
them. Second, and more importantly, we show that even a weed-free
failure-to-warn garden may not be beneficially productive. Part II, accordingly, demonstrates that applying even well-framed negligence doctrine to test the adequacy of product warnings provides little more than
an occasion for mouthing rhetoric. Concepts such as risk foreseeability,
risk-utility balancing, and proximate causation are so devoid of content
in the failure-to-warn context that they cannot hope to test the bona fides
of the plaintiff's claim. We conclude that even a well-tended failure-towarn garden probably cannot support growth. The real problem, it turns
out, is not with the weeds. It is steeped in the soil of negligence itself.
Can anything be done to put things right with respect to this second,
more profound difficulty? We have no remedies that can be set in place
easily. The problems we describe may defy solution. Nevertheless, we
believe it is necessary to take a hard look at what is happening in failureto-warn cases. For one thing, even if the situation in products cases is
beyond meaningful remedy, other areas relying on failure-to-warn theories may find what we have to say useful. For another, it may yet be
possible to develop solutions which lie in the middle ground between the
trivial and the draconian. Because we have reason to believe that courts
will be increasingly receptive to reasonable proposals for change, we feel
19 See, e.g., Moran v. Faberg6, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 544, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975); Freund v.
Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 238 n.1, 432 A.2d 925, 930 n.1 (1981); Dambacher v.
Mallis, 336 Pa. Super. 22, 58 n.7, 485 A.2d 408, 427 n.7 (1984); Wheeler v. General Tire &

Rubber Co., 142 Wis. 2d 798, 811-13, 419 N.W.2d 331, 336-37 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). For
early discussions noting the comparative ease of proving a warning case over a design case, see
Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 26063 (1969).
20 For attempts to introduce such marginal adjustments in failure-to-warn law without
attacking the problems discussed in this paper, see Model Uniform Prod. Liab. Act § 104(c),
44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) [hereinafter MUPLA].
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bound to advance our own proposals. We urge that courts (and if not

courts, legislatures) adopt firmer, nontrivial guidelines for the adjudication of product warnings cases. We offer these guidelines with the hope
that from them may evolve a reasoned set of principles with which judges
can more fairly and effectively adjudicate warnings claims.

I
WEEDING THE FAILURE-TO-WARN GARDEN

As we shall demonstrate in Part II, negligence doctrine, even if free
from errors, will not rescue failure-to-warn litigation from its inherent
lawlessness. However, these errors cannot be ignored. Bad doctrine
serves to increase exponentially the unfairness in a cause of action that is
already unformed and unbounded. We thus begin by turning to fundamental doctrinal errors that have infected failure-to-warn case law in
many jurisdictions.

A.

The "Strict Liability v. Negligence" Debate

Modem American products liability started off on the wrong
doctrinal foot twenty-five years ago and has never regained its stride. To
understand the nature of the problem, one must examine it in historical
context. The American Law Institute gave birth to this analytic confusion with the highly influential section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, which states that strict liability applies equally well to cases

21
involving manufacturing defects, design defects, and failures to warn.

Strict liability can be applied coherently in manufacturing defect cases
because a product's defectiveness can be determined without resort to
negligence-oriented cost-benefit balancing. 22 But in both defective-design
and failure-to-warn cases, cost-benefit balancing is inevitably required to
determine product defectiveness. 23 Because cost-benefit balancing is also
21 The text of § 402A does not explicitly state that it applies to design and warnings claims.
But its comments, especially comments h, i, j, k, and p, make clear that the drafters intended
that result. And courts ever since have read it this way. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-33, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441-42 (1972).
22 See MUPLA, supra note 20, § 104(A) & comments. Many courts have recognized that
the legal standard for manufacturing defects is relatively simple as compared to generically
dangerous products. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880 (Alaska
1979); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 959 (1976); Prentis
v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 683-84, 365 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1984).
23 Most of the recent literature in products liability has focused on the reasonableness test
and the appropriateness of risk-utility balancing as a method for establishing the existence or
defects. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence to [Warraity] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 618-31 (1980); Epstein, Products
Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 643, 648-54 (1978); Henderson,
Defective Product Design, supra note 11, at 773-81; Henderson, Expanding the Negligence
Concept, supra note 8, at 482-522; Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note
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at the heart of negligence, 24 it is no easy matter in design and warning
cases to discover a difference between strict liability and negligence.

Having adopted strict liability across the board, courts found themselves trapped by their own rhetoric. Strict liability, as everyone knows,
is a doctrine more favorable to plaintiffs than is negligence. Thus, courts

which found that in the midst of "strict liability" cases they were kneedeep in traditional negligence balancing, undertook a prolonged search
for the strict liability "edge." After years of frustration, many courts
have finally abandoned the search and declared that, for all intents and
purposes, strict liability, as applied to generically dangerous product
cases, was simply negligence by another name. 25 However, many courts

continue to insist that strict liability provides some practical benefit to
claimants that negligence doctrine does not. 26 In doing so they have
been forced either to articulate outrageous positions that both deeply of8, at 1552-73; Henderson, Proposed Statutory Reform, supra note 11, at 630-32; Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. Rev. 109, 11222 (1976); Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 Cumb.
L. Rev. 293, 310-13 (1979); Twerski, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 8, at 347-58; Vandall,
"Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 Ohio St.
L.J. 61, 72-75 (1982); Note, Products Liability-Negligence Presumed: An Evolution, 67 Tox.
L. Rev. 851, 859-64 (1989); see generally Note, Strict Products Liability and the Risk-Utility
Test for Design Defect: An Economic Analysis, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 2045 (1984).
Most courts have adopted risk-utility as either an exclusive or an alternative ground of
liability. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagen, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071-73 (4th Cir. 1974)
(exclusive ground); CaterpillarTractor, 593 P.2d at 885 (alternative ground); Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (1978) (alternative ground); Camacho v.
Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246-49 (Colo. 1987) (exclusive ground); Prentis,421 Mich.
at 686-90, 365 N.W.2d at 185-86 (exclusive ground); Bilotta v. Kelley Co., Inc., 346 N.W.2d
616, 622 (Minn. 1984) (exclusive ground); Lewis v. Bucyrus-Erie, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 920, 927
(Mo. 1981) (exclusive ground); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 807, 395
A.2d 843, 846 (1978) (alternative ground); Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J.
386, 394, 451 A.2d 179, 183 (1982) (exclusive ground); Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 26667, 461 N.E.2d 864, 866, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 386 (1983) (exclusive ground); Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 67-68, 577 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1978) (exclusive ground); Morningstar
v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 162 W. Va. 857, 887-90, 253 S.E.2d 666, 682-83 (1979) (exclusive
ground). Federal statutes also use the reasonableness concept in setting design standards. See,
e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f) (1988); Consumer
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056(a), 2058(c) (1988).
24 In perhaps the most famous formulation of the negligence concept, in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 158 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), Judge Learned Hand observed: "[The
defendant's] duty.., to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1)
The probability [of an accident]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if [an accident occurs];
(3) the burden of adequate precautions."
25 See, e.g., Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986); Flaminio v. Honda
Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1984); Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574
F.2d 1182, 1190 (5th Cir. 1978); St. Germain v. Husgvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1285 (Me.
1988); Prentis, 421 Mich. at 687-88, 365 N.W.2d at 180-82 (1986); Rainbow v. Albert Ella
Bldg. Co., 49 A.D.2d 250, 252-53, 373 N.Y.S.2d 928, 930-31 (1975); Memphis Bank & Trust
Co. v. Water Serv., 758 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
26 See cases cited in note 28 infra.
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fend traditional notions of moral responsibility and prevent tort law from
achieving its objectives, or to create verbal distinctions that have little
practical consequence other than to confuse litigants and commentators.
We turn first to an example of the former type of error, and then to some
examples of the latter.
1.

Liabilityfor Failing to Warn About Unknowable Risks

Courts might distinguish between product-oriented strict liability
theory and conduct-oriented negligence theory by dispensing with the
reasonable foreseeability standard which lies at the heart of negligence
theory. A plaintiff could then recover for damages caused by a defective
product even though the risk that the plaintiff claims should have been
warned against was unforeseeable at the time the product was distributed. Given this distinction, a negligence standard, with its focus on the
conduct of the manufacturer, would impose liability for failure to warn
only when the defendant knew, or should have known, of the relevant
information. 27 In contrast, a reasonable manufacturer could be found
liable under a strict liability standard even if he had no access to the
28
information that later became available.

However tempting it may be for courts to hold distributors

"strictly" liable for unknowable risks, doing so prevents the achievement
of either of two contrasting objectives underlying tort law, as identified
by the majority of commentators. One view regards tort law as essentially enhancing non-instrumental norms of fairness which mediate between conflicting individual preferences. 29 The other view interprets tort
27 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 289 commentj (1965) (failure to investigate risk of
harm constituted actionable negligence where conditions were such that reasonable person
would investigate); 3 The Law of Torts, supra note 2, § 16.5 (negligence centers on actual or
reasonable foreseeability).
28 See Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tex. L Rev. 398, 404
(1970) (seller should be liable even if she neither knew, could have known, nor ought to have
known unreasonable risk actually existed); see also Miller v. Upjohn Co., 465 So. 2d 42, 45
(La. Ct. App.) (strict liability holds for product liability cases, except for drug cases, regardless
of manufacturer's knowledge of risk), cert. denied, 467 So. 2d 533 (La. 1985); Bilotta v. Kelley
Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984) ("The distinction between strict liability and negligence indesign defect and failure-to-warn cases is that in strict liability, knowledge of the
condition of the product and the risks involved in that condition will be imputed to the manufacturer, whereas in negligence these elements must be proven."); Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co.,
274 Or. 403, 417 n.12, 547 P.2d 132, 142 n.12 (1976) (foreseeability not appropriate consideration when determining whether manufacturer should be liable without fault), rev'd on other
grounds, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 465, 525 P.2d
125, 129 (1974) (designer strictly liable even though his actions were entirely reasonable considering his knowledge at time of product design and sale).
29 See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L Rev. 537, 540-41 (1972)
(identifying non-instrumental "paradigm of reciprocity" as one underlying concern of tort
law).
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law as essentially furthering instrumental, allocative efficiency objectives,
which help competitive markets put resources to their highest uses without attempting to mediate between individual preferences. 30
If we assume, under the fairness view, that a basic postulate of legal
duty is that the conduct the law seeks to induce is capable of being performed and, as a corollary, that the law eschews imposing duties to perform impossible tasks, 3 ' then imposing liability for failure to warn of
unknowable risks is grossly unfair.32 On the other hand, imposing liability for failing to warn of scientifically unknowable risks also strikes hard
against the efficiency objective. As a number of commentators have
noted, manufacturers cannot, by hypothesis, insure against risks that
even reasonably careful persons do not know exist. 33 As a consequence,
when strict liability is imposed retroactively for risks about which the
defendants could not have known at distribution, defendants can only
charge the losses against earnings or capital, or go out of business. Either
way, inefficiencies result. Later entrants to the market enjoy a decided
advantage over earlier entrants who are saddled with obligations that
they could not insure against or avoid by exercising reasonable care. A
rule that penalizes longevity and contradicts fundamental rules of risk
spreading by asking the impossible of manufacturers is counterproductive 34 and likely headed for oblivion. Negligence, not strict liability,
should, and eventually will, govern the time dimension issues in products
liability litigation.
Although strict liability here serves neither fairness nor efficiency, a
small cadre of courts have nevertheless followed the lead of the New
Jersey Supreme Court 35 and have imposed liability for defendants' failure
30 See generally G. Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (1970) (goal of accident
minimize costs both of accidents and of their avoidance).

law is to

31 See Henderson, Process Constraints in Tort, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 901, 914-15 (1982).
32 One might argue that strict liability does not require changes in primary conduct-the

actor held strictly liable is not expected to invest further in safety precautions but rather
merely to insure against losses that are not worth preventing. But when risks are unknowable,
they cannot be insured against. See note 33 and accompanying text infra. Moreover, the concept of failure to warn unavoidably implies the failure by the defendant to do something he
should have and could have done.
33 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 16, at 736 (concluding that it is both unfair and inefficient
to impose liability for risks which would not be revealed fully by cost-effective research).
34 See Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13 St.
Mary's L.J. 521, 546 (1982) (imposition of strict liability for failure to warn denies public of
valuable products); see also Wheeler & Kress, A Comment on Recent Developments in Judicial Imputation of Post-Manufacture Knowledge in Strict Liability Cases, 6 J. Prod. Liab. 127,
137-40 (1983) (arguing that imputation of post-manufacture knowledge in warning cases will
increase disproportionately the liability of producers of food and chemical products over
mechanical products).
35 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204, 447 A.2d 539, 546 (1982)
(rejecting "state of the art" defense in strict liability cases).
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to warn of risks which were scientifically unknowable when the product
was marketed. 36 In a later decision, the New Jersey court did restrict its
earlier holding to asbestos cases. 37 Thus, under current New Jersey law,

for all other warnings cases predicated on strict liability, the defendant
now bears "the burden of proving that the information was not reasonably available or obtainable and that it therefore lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the defect."' 38 However, it is questionable
whether this partial retreat is meaningful. Given that defendants are unlikely to carry the burden of proving a negative, the modified New Jersey
rule may be the functional equivalent of true strict liability. Whatever

the label, the point is the same. Liability for unknowable risks is a weed
that should not be allowed to take root in the failure-to-warn garden.
2. The Semantic Disputes

a

The "Productv. Conduct" Imbroglio. Some courts in failure-to-

warn cases distinguish between strict liability and negligence on the
ground that the former focuses on the quality of the product, while the
latter focuses on the conduct of the defendant. 39 Courts that speak in

these terms employ such delphic language that it is often difficult to identify the point they are trying to make.
36 See, e.g., Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337, 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986)
(applying Washington law); In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 699 F. Supp. 233, 236 (D. Haw.
1988) (applying Hawaii law); Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 413, 462 N.E.2d 273, 277
(1984); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984) (en bane); Carrecter v.
Colson Equip. Co., 346 Pa. Super. 95, 101,499 A.2d 326, 330-31 (1985). Courts in several preBeshada cases held defendants strictly liable for information which was unavailable to reasonable manufacturers. See note 28 supra; see also Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499
F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A to hold defendant's reasonable belief immaterial in strict liability). A comprehensive compilation of the
case law can be found in Campbell & Edwards, The Duty to Warn and the Duty to Inform:
Marketing Defects in Strict Products Liability 3-9 (Defense Research Monograph No. 6,
1989).
37 Feldman v. Lederele Laboratories, 97 NJ. 429, 455, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984). Feldman
was later upheld against an equal protection attack. See In re Asbestos Litigation. 829 F.2d
1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1987) (denial of "state of the art" defense to asbestos manufacturer neither
violated any fundamental rights nor created a suspect classification), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1029 (1988).
38 Feldman, 97 NJ. at 455-56, 479 A.2d at 388.
39 See, e.g., Falk v. Keene Corp., 53 Wash. App. 238, 244-46, 767 P.2d 576, 580-81
("[Strict liability] focuses on a manufacturer's defective product, the burden of an alternative
design, and consumer expectations. As such, it is a fundamentally and irreconcilably different
analysis from negligence, which focuses on a manufacturer's conduct."), affd, 113 Vash. 2d
645, 782 P.2d 974 (1989) (en bane); see also Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 I11. 2d 26, 34,
402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (1980) (failure to warn requires scienter, but "strict liability has been
upheld as a distinguishable doctrine from its counterpart in negligence, based on the fact that it
is the inadequacy of the warning that is looked to, rather than the conduct of the particular
manufacturer .. ").
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Perhaps these courts sense that a negligence standard, which speaks
to reasonable behavior, will be too easy on defendants, whereas the product-oriented strict liability theory is, appropriately, less forgiving. Alternatively, such courts may believe that a "reasonable manufacturer"
standard would not be sufficiently demanding of the smaller manufacturer, who may be unable to invest heavily in research and development.
Assuming we are correct in our observations, these underlying concerns do not warrant so fine a distinction between product and conduct.
Concern that a negligence standard may be too forgiving is clearly misplaced. The law of negligence is based on the hypothetical reasonable
person. 40 The test is objective; subjective factors peculiar to individual
defendants generally do not excuse liability.4 1 Moreover, manufacturers
are held to the standard of investigation and knowledge of an expert in
the field. 4 2 Thus, courts already have a specific rule, devised long ago in
negligence law, to assure that ignorance will not be excused where information was reasonably attainable by those with sophisticated expertise.
Perhaps the only practical difference between negligence and strict
liability cases is that juries occasionally will be harder on defendants
when applying a strict liability instruction than they would be when
holding them to the standard of an expert in the field. Nonetheless, considering the confusion that results from the coexistence of two such
closely related theories, the "product versus conduct" game is not worth
the candle. Once again, traditional negligence should emerge as the prevailing theory in failure-to-warn cases; the product/conduct distinction is
another weed which needs to be pulled.
b. The Relevance of Contributory Fault. Another possible reason
for framing failure-to-warn claims in terms of strict liability is related to
the role of plaintiff's contributory fault in products litigation. Some
courts have held that contributory fault, which is relevant in the negligence context, is not a defense to a strict liability claim. 4 3 And many
more have held that, even if contributory fault is a defense in strict liability, a plaintiff's failure to inspect a product for defects does not count as
contributory fault 4 At bottom, courts' different treatments of these afSee Restatement (Second) of Torts § 291 comment c (1965).
41 See id. § 289 comment n; see also note 42 infra.
42 See 4 The Law of Torts, supra note 2, § 28.4.
43 See, e.g., Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Bowling v. Heil Co., 31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 285, 511 N.E.2d 373, 378 (1987); Kirkland v. General
Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974); Staymates v. ITT Holub Indus., 364 Pa.
40

Super. 37, 47, 527 A.2d 140, 145 (1987).

44 See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 161-62 n.14 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying law of Virgin Islands); Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 108 Ill. 2d 146, 152, 483 N.E.2d
1, 3 (1985).
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firmative defenses reflect a difference of opinion as to whether productrelated risks are best borne entirely by the manufacturers who have created them or should be partially borne by negligent users and consumers.4 5 But why the answer to this question should necessarily depend on

whether the case is styled in negligence or strict liability is not clear. A
court could just as easily work within the traditional negligence framework in a failure-to-warn case and remain free to resolve the issue of

product-related contributory fault as it sees fit.4 The policy ground for
absolving the plaintiff from some aspect of fault need not be tied formally
to the requisites of the plaintiff's prima facie case.
a Summing Up the Semantic Dispute The Importance of Terminology. Many courts that acknowledge negligence as the substantive basis of failure-to-warn liability nevertheless insist on behaving as though
strict liability were somehow being applied. 47 Thus, courts instruct juries
that an important issue in the plaintiff's strict liability claim is whether
the product was defective, and that defectiveness depends, in turn, on
whether a reasonable manufacturer would have known of the risk and

would have warned against

it.48

So long as everybody understands that

nothing more than a word game is being played, there is nothing inherently wrong in defining strict liability for product defects in negligence
45 Compare Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo.
L. Rev. 431, 432-33 (1978) (arguing that introduction of comparative negligence defense in
products liability cases would encourage consumer carefulness) and Schwartz, Strict Liability
and Comparative Negligence, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 171, 179 (1976) (claiming that comparative
negligence in products liability cases justifiably places costs on individual user) with Twerski,
The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 Ind. L Rev. 797,
829-30 (1977) (arguing for limited application of comparative negligence in products liability
law). See also Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 373, 391 (1978) (Uniform Act would allow introduction of
comparative negligence into products liability law).
46 See, eg., Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1412 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying
Kansas law to uphold jury instruction under which manufacturer has a strict duty of care and
consumer a duty of ordinary care); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737, 575
P.2d 1162, 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 387 (1978) (adopting comparative fault for products
liability cases after reviewing relevant policies and refusing to be bound by linguistic labels);
Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 171-72 (La. 1985) (stating that comparative fault will
be used in a products liability case when reduction of award realistically will promote user care
without drastically reducing manufacturers' incentive to make a safer product).
47 See, e.g., Payne v. Soft Sheen Prods., Inc., 486 A.2d 712, 725-26 (D.C. 1985) (cause of
action for injuries from defective product could sound either in negligence or strict liability);
Jarrell v. Monsanto Co., 528 N.E.2d 1158, 1168 n.7 (Ind.Ct. App. 1988) (noting difficulty of
distinguishing between negligence and strict liability in failure-to-warn cases); Frederick v.
Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 107 A.D.2d 1063, 1064, 486 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565 (1985) (little
difference between failure-to-warn cases under strict liability or negligence).
48 See, eg., Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 698, 677 P.2d 1147, 1151-52, 200
Cal. Rptr. 870, 874 (1989) (upholding jury verdict based on instruction that products liability
defendant had duty to inform medical profession if it "knew or should have known" or risks).
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terms. Indeed, if everybody were likely to understand that much, it

would do no real harm to call this "thunderbolt liability" or "gonzo liability."'49 However, people tend to give real meaning to differences in
terminology; they forget that word games are being played. Thus,

although mixing negligence and strict liability concepts is often a game of
semantics, the game has more than semantic impact-it breeds confusion
and, inevitably, bad law.
B.

The Causation Presumption
Many courts have held that when the defendant fails to provide an
adequate warning, it is presumed that such a warning would have been
read and heeded by the user had it been given.50 This presumption serves
to get the plaintiff over the hurdle of establishing causation in all but the

weakest of cases. The rationale most often given for the presumption is
that it is a mirror image of a presumption that defendants enjoy under

comment j to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.51 That
comment provides:
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will
be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is
safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it un52
reasonably dangerous.
It is argued that if a seller is entitled to a presumption that a warning will
be read and heeded, a plaintiff should be entitled to the converse causa53
tion presumption when no warning, or an inadequate warning, is given.
We will consider in a later discussion the substantive merits of granting
49 As Humpty Dumpty, in Through the Looking Glass, observed: "When I use a word...
it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less." L. Carroll, The Annotated
Alice: Alice's Adventures in Wonderland & Through The Looking Glass 269 (C. Potter ed.
1960).
50 See, e.g., Benoit v. Ryan Chevrolet, 428 So. 2d 489, 493 n.8 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla. 1974); Menard v. Newhall, 135
Vt. 53, 54, 373 A.2d 505, 506 (1977); see also 3 American Law of Products Liability § 32:74, at
118 (3d ed. 1987) (stating that "[w]here the product has no warning, it may be presumed that
the plaintiff would have read and heeded the proper warning had one been given," and citing
cases).
51 See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir.) (applying Texas
law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'i
Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd on procedural grounds, 265 Ind.
457, 358 N.E.2d 974 (1976); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 235 Kan. 387, 410,
681 P.2d 1038, 1057, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Mass.
App. Ct. 346, 352, 376 N.E.2d 143, 147 (1978); Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 517 (N.D.
1989); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 200, 423 N.E.2d 831, 838 (1981);
Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972). But see Potthoff v. Alms,
583 P.2d 309, 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (affirming trial court's refusal to instruct jury that if a
warning is given, it will be heeded).
52 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment j (1965).
53 See cases cited in note 50 supra.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

May 1990]

FAILURE TO WARN

the plaintiff this causation presumption. 54 Our more limited objective
here is to show that the logic of the courts that rely formally on comment
j is seriously flawed. Plaintiffs may deserve a presumption regarding causation, but such a presumption cannot be derived logically from comment j.
A closer analysis of the causation presumption is required to see
why it does not derive logically from comment j. If a risk is not obvious
to a substantial number of users and consumers, and a proper warning
will suffice to bring that risk to the attention of most such users and
55
consumers, then the defendant owes a duty to provide such a warning.
Once such a warning is provided, the product is no longer in a defective
condition, as it is not unreasonably dangerous to consumers. And when
the product is reasonably safe and nondefective, the question of causation
in the particular case involving the particular plaintiff is never reached.
Thus, when comment j says that "the seller may reasonably assume," it is
not referring to a presumption that any individual plaintiff actually did
read and heed the warning; to the contrary, it is certain from the outset
that at least some consumers will not have done so. 5 6 Rather, comment j
says that if the warning is adequate and is likely to reach many, even if
not all, consumers, then, for purposes of determining whether the defendant has discharged his underlying duty to warn, it reasonably may be
assumed that consumers will act on the warning. Once the conclusion is
reached that the defendant has satisfied this duty, the plaintiff's claim
fails at the threshold and the question of individualized causation never
arises.
To insist that any particular plaintiff should enjoy a presumption of
individualized causation when adequate warnings are not given because
the defendant enjoys such a presumption when warnings are given is to
rely on false logic. Comment j never addresses the causation issue, as
such, nor does it create any presumption of individualized causation benefiting defendants. All it says is that, if the defendant provides an adequate warning, he fulfills his duty of care, and that, in determining the
adequacy of the warning, courts will examine its likely effects on reasonable consumers generally, not the actual effects on particular consumers.
Thus, to rely on comment j to derive a presumption of actual, individual
causation for plaintiffs in failure-to-warn cases is to commit serious error.
54 See text accompanying notes 246-50 infra.
55 See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 6, § 96 at 685-86, 697; 4 The Law orTorts, supra note

2, § 27.16.
56 See Schwartz & Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need for Synthesis of Law
and Communication Theory, 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 38, 51 (1983).
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C. DoctrinalErrors Relating to the Obviousness

of Product-RelatedRisks
The general rule in American products law is that defendants owe

no duty to warn of risks that are obvious to normal, reasonable users and
consumers.- 7 Warnings are required with respect to hidden risks, but
obvious risks are better left to consumers themselves, or to product designers, to identify and minimize.5 8 Perhaps more than any other aspect
of warnings doctrine, this traditional rule should help courts cull unwor-

thy failure-to-warn claims from the worthy. And yet, in spite of its universal acceptance as a general proposition, the rule regarding obvious

risks is beset with problems in its application. One of these difficultiesthe unwillingness of some courts to resolve cases for defendants as a mat-

ter of law when there is a paucity of proof to support the conclusion that

59
the risks are other than obvious-is considered in a later discussion.
Here we examine more basic doctrinal errors-where courts have misap-

plied the law governing obvious risks in ways that render all but impossible the task of managing certain types of failure-to-warn claims.
Clearly the most dramatic example of doctrinal error is the refusal
of some courts to adhere to the traditional rule that obvious risks need

not be warned against. To understand how judicial negation of such a
sensible position could have occurred, a brief detour into design litigation
is necessary. For many years, a so-called "patent danger rule" operated
in a majority of jurisdictions as a complete barrier to liability based on
allegedly defective designA0 This doctrine came under heavy attack from

legal commentators who argued, with justification, that the obviousness
of the danger speaks to only one of several factors in the risk-utility
57 See, e.g., Argubright v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 868 F.2d 764, 766 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 325 (1989); Plante v. Hobart Corp., 771 F.2d 617, 620 (1st Cir. 1985); Smith v. Hub
Mfg., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1505, 1508 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Complaint of Diehl, 610 F. Supp. 223,
227 (D. Idaho 1985); Fanning v. LeMay, 38 Ill. 2d 209, 212, 230 N.E.2d 182, 185 (1967);
Duncan v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 So. 2d 968, 971 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Bell v.
Wysong & Miles Co., 26 Mass. App. 1011, 531 N.E.2d 267, 269 (1988), review denied, 404
Mass. 1101, 536 N.E.2d 612 (1989); Spaulding v. Lesco Int'l Corp., 182 Mich. App. 285, 451
N.W.2d 603, 609 (1990); Nabkey v. Jack Locks Enters., Inc., 376 Mich. 397, 400-01, 137
N.W.2d 132, 134 (1965); Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, 239 Mo. App. 355, 359, 186
S.W.2d 217, 220 (1945); Ruggiero v. Max Braun & Sons, Inc., 141 A.D.2d 528, 529-30, 529
N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (1988); Berry v. Eckhardt Porsche Audi, Inc., 578 P.2d 1195, 1196 (Okla.
1978).
58 The reference to product designers refers to the fact that some risks must be designed
against even though they are obvious. See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465,
474, 467 P.2d 229, 235, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 635 (1970) (manufacturer had duty to correct
obvious blind spot in bulldozer).
59 See text accompanying notes 200-12 infra.
60 The leading case expressing the patent danger rule was Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468,
95 N.E.2d 802 (1950). Campo was overruled by Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348
N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
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formula governing design-based liability. 6' The obviousness of risk tends
to reduce, but does not invariably eliminate, the likelihood of injury. In
other words, the obviousness of the risk suggests that it is less likely that
cost-effective design alternatives are available, but plaintiffs should not be
foreclosed categorically from making such a showing. Over the past several decades, a majority of courts have adopted this reasoning and have
abolished the patent danger rule as a threshold limitation on defendants'
duty in design cases. 62 Ironically, commentators have argued more recently that the patent danger doctrine reflects important contractual
norms which should not have been abandoned so quickly.63 Some
courts have steadfastly adhered to the patent danger doctrine in design
cases. 64
Whether the patent danger rule in design defect litigation makes
sense is a close question, and the controversy regarding its validity is
understandable. For example, even courts that do not formally recognize
the patent danger rule sometimes conclude in a particular case that the
obviousness of the risk bars recovery for allegedly bad design as a matter
of law. 6 5 What is puzzling is that some courts have concluded that the
demise of the patent danger rule in design cases also has meaning with
61 See, e.g., Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An Analysis and a Survey of Its Vitality, 29
Mercer L. Rev. 583 (1978) (patent danger rule ignores risk-utility analysis); Marschall, An
Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right. Manufacturers' Liability for Patently Dangerous
Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1065 (1973) (obviousness test ignores fairness concerns).
62 See, e.g., Pike, 2 Cal. 3d at 474, 467 P.2d at 234, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 635 (obviousness
irrelevant to issue of duty); Auburn Mach. Works Co., Inc. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1167
(Fla. 1979) (potency of danger relevant only as part of defendant's case); Holm v. Sponco
Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 208-13 (Minn. 1982) (patent danger test incompatible with public
policy of apportioning loss).
63 See P. Huber, Liability, The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 19-32 (1988) (contractual norms, rather than tort rules, should predominate); Epstein, supra note 14, at 474-75
(risk-utility balancing for patent dangers violates market norms); Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale LJ. 1297, 1350 (1981) (consumers who can control level of
risk by prudent product use would prefer standardized contractual disclaimers as a means of
avoiding higher product costs which reflect riskier use by other consumers). But see Whitford,
Comment on a Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 91 Yale L.J. 1371, 1382 & n.39
(1982) (udicial decisions expanding warranty liability may improve efficiency of loss allocation). For a reply to Whitford, see Priest, The Best Evidence of the Effect of Products Liability
Law on Accident Rate: Reply, 91 Yale L.J. 1386 (1982).
64 See, e.g., Hedgepeth v. Fruehauf Corp., 634 F. Supp. 93, 98 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (open and
obvious danger of walking on slick deck in cowboy boots defeated claim); Orkin Exterminating
Co. v. Dawn Food Prods., 186 Ga. App. 201, 203, 366 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1988) (no duty to
protect against patent defects); Bemis Co., Inc. v. Rubush, 427 N.E.2d 1058, 1061-64 (Ind.
1981) (no duty to warn of obvious danger), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); McCollum v.
Grove Mfg. Co., 58 N.C. App. 283, 287, 293 S.E.2d 632, 635 (1982) (where machine patently
dangerous because of method of functioning, manufacturer has duty to eliminate only latent
defects), aff'd, 307 N.C. 695, 300 S.E.2d 374 (1983).
65 See, e.g., Jackson v. Coming Glass Works, 538 A.2d 666, 669 (RI. 1988).
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reference to claims based on failure to warn. 66 Yet, the argument for
abandoning the patent danger rule in warnings cases, simply because the
rule has been abandoned in design cases, makes no sense. In a-design
case, the obviousness of the danger does not necessarily preclude the possibility that an alternative design would reduce the risk cost-effectively. 67
By contrast, assuming that some risks are patently obvious, 68 the obviousness of a product-related risk invariably serves the same function as a
warning that the risk is present. Thus, nothing is to be gained by adding
a warning of the danger already telegraphed by the product itself.69
Fortunately, only a small minority of jurisdictions have rejected the
traditional patent danger rule, holding that defendants must warn of obvious risks.7 0 However, a larger number of courts have committed related errors by placing on defendants the burdens of production and
persuasion on the obviousness issue. Traditionally (and, we argue, properly), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, as part of his prima facie
case, that the risk that materialized in harm was not obvious. 7 1 However, a minority of courts now shift the burden to the defendant by one of
two methods. A few courts speak of the obviousness of the risk explicitly, as though it were an affirmative defense; 72 a somewhat larger
number justify sending close cases to the jury by using language that
suggests that the defendant somehow failed to carry its burden of proving
obviousness.7 3 Shifting the burden of proof, whether explicitly or implicitly, constitutes a departure from well-established doctrine and contributes to the inability of judges to sort out warnings claims consistently and
coherently.
Yet another error relating to obviousness involves the question of
66 See Harris v. Karri-On Campers, Inc., 640 F.2d 65, 67 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying West
Virginia law); Horen v. Coleco Indus., Inc., 169 Mich. App. 725, 729-30, 426 N.W.2d 794, 796
(1988); Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 207-08, 485 A.2d 305, 309-11
(1984); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530, 536-37 (N.D. 1977).
67 See notes 61-62 supra.
68 For a discussion and rejection of the proposition that no risks are ever completely obvious, see text accompanying notes 200-12 infra.
69 See note 57 supra.
70 See note 66 supra.
71 See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Brown, 526 N.E.2d 719, 728-29 (Ind.Ct. App. 1988).
72 See, e.g., Shaffer v. AMF, Inc., 842 F.2d 893, 897 (6th Cir. 1988) (dictum); Butz v.
Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 512 n.2 (N.D. 1980) (dictum).
73 See, e.g., Soto v. E.W. Bliss Div. of Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 116 Ill.
App. 3d 880, 886-87,
452 N.E.2d 572, 577-78 (1983) (defendant claimed it had no duty to warn because risks associated with operating punch press were open and obvious; court stated that risks were less obvious and that it was "a question of fact as to whether the lack of warning rendered the press
unreasonably dangerous"); Long v. Deere & Co., 238 Kan. 766, 772-74, 715 P.2d 1023, 103233 (1986) (defendant argued that warnings on crawler loader, if inadequate, were not as a
matter of law proximate cause of plaintiff's injury; court stated that issue was properly submitted to jury).
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whether different categories of users and consumers should be treated
differently. Most courts agree that for purposes of determining whether
the defendant owed a duty to warn of a particular risk, the standard for
testing obviousness is objective. Thus, the issue for purposes of determining whether a breach of duty occurred is not whether the plaintiff actually recognized the risk, 74 but whether a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position would have done so."5 Under traditional failure-towarn doctrine, if more than one category of users and consumers is
foreseeably likely to use or consume the product, then the duty owed to
the particular plaintiff will be judged by the category of users or consumers into which the plaintiff falls. 76 If the plaintiff is an expert, no duty to
warn may be owed him even if such duties are owed to non-expert users
or consumers. 77 However, some courts have confused the issue of the
objectivity of the obviousness standard with the issue of who should review that standard. Thus, courts faced with lawsuits by consumer-experts have shifted the question of whether a risk was obvious to a
reasonable expert from the duty element of the plaintiff's claim to the
issue of proximate cause. 73 The latter inquiry, in contrast to the issue of
defendant's duty, is almost always for the jury, not the judge, to decide.
This confusion prevents courts from weeding out cases which should be
decided for the defendant as a matter of law. 79
One final doctrinal error relating to the obviousness of risks in warnings cases remains to be identified. We have observed that non-obviousness is a necessary condition to recovery for failure to warn. It does
not follow, however, that it should also constitute a sufficient condition
for holding a defendant liable. That is, a defendant manufacturer does
not owe users and consumers a duty to warn of all risks that are not
74 When the plaintiff has actual knowledge of an otherwise hidden risk from another information source, the defendant's failure to warn, though tortious, is deemed not to have caused
the plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., Horak v. Pullman, Inc., 764 F.2d 1092, 1096-97 (5th Cir.
1985) (where plaintiff had actual knowledge of danger, lack of warning not proximate cause of
back injury).
75 See note 55 supra; see, e.g., Malek v. Miller Brewing Co., 749 S.V.2d 521, 522 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988) (defendant has no duty to warn of danger of driving after drinking defendant's
brand of beer).
76 If a foreseeable class of users or consumers is inexperienced or inept, the warnings must
be adjusted accordingly. See, e.g., Todalen v. United States Chem. Co., 424 N.W.2d 73, 80
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (user's lack of special knowledge of risks associated with caustic cleaning product a factor in defining defendant's duty to warn).
77 See, e.g., Du Cote v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 451 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (La. Ct. App.) (no
duty to warn electrician of risk of electrocution from using ungrounded power saw), cert.
denied, 457 So. 2d 15 (La. 1984).
78 See, e.g., Glittenburg v. Wilcenski, 174 Mich. App. 321, 327-28, 435 N.W.2d 480, 483
(1989) (plaintiff's expertise went to issue of proximate cause, not duty to warn).
79 For a discussion of why these kinds of cases should not be sent to the jury, see notes 10104 and accompanying text infra.
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obvious, but only non-obvious risks that bear some special causal nexus
to the defendant's product. The product must, in some sense of the
word, "create" the risk. If it does not, then the manufacturer should not
be required to supply warnings, even if the risks are not obvious to users
and consumers.
An example will help clarify this point. Assume M is a producer
and retailer of shoes. One day M sells P a new pair of shoes. P walks
onto a snow-covered, frozen pond wearing the shoes and falls through
the ice. P sues M claiming that M should have warned him about walking onto snow-covered ponds in the winter. Assume that P argues, persuasively, that the risk of falling through snow-covered ice is not obvious
to the class of persons (visitors from warmer climes) of which he is a
member, and that the warning could have been included in the brochure
supplied with the shoes which already warned, among other things,
about how the leather soles of the new shoes become slippery when wet.
Should this plaintiff reach the jury? We submit that he should not, even
if a reasonable jury could find that the risks of weak ice on snow-covered
ponds were not obvious to reasonable persons in the plaintiff's position.
The defendant's shoes had nothing, or almost nothing,80 to do with the
plaintiff's falling through the ice. The failure to warn may have proximately caused the accident in the sense that a warning would have prevented the accident. But a court should conclude that the defendant
owed no duty to warn of risks not created by its product.3 '
Notwithstanding the good sense of this conclusion, a number of
courts have imposed a duty to warn on facts similar to these.8 2 While a
larger number have refused,83 the potential for error is great. The nonobviousness of the risk to the users, together with the apparent opportunity to reduce the risk by requiring the defendant to warn, lure some
courts into pressing defendants to perform a warnings function that
80 He was wearing the shoes. But presumably he would have worn other shoes if not these.
The particular shoes produced by M had nothing to do with motivating or not preventing P's
walk across the pond.
81 If frozen ponds, then stairs? Slippery slopes?
82 See, e.g., Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, 564-65, 667 P.2d 750, 758-59
(Ct. App. 1983) (power saw manufacturer should warn against risk of electrocution from using
saw with frayed extension cord); DeLeon v. Commercial Mfg. & Supply Co., 148 Cal. App. 3d
336, 349, 195 Cal. Rptr. 867, 875 (1983) (defendant owed duty to warn purchaser of bin not to
set it up near dangerous machinery).
83 See, e.g., Davis v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 719 P.2d 324, 328 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (no
duty to warn tractor driver that dead tree might fall on him); In re Dickens, 161 I11.App. 3d
565, 570-71, 515 N.E.2d 208, 211 (1987) (no duty to warn antenna purchaser not to touch high
tension wire); Keirs v. Weber Int'l Stores, Inc., 352 Pa. Super. 111, 117, 507 A.2d 406, 409
(1986) (no duty to warn consumer against dousing jacket with flammable liquid and exposing
it to flames).
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makes unfair and possibly inefficient demands on them.M
As our subsequent discussion makes clear,8 5 the largest single error
courts commit with respect to the element of obviousness is not directly
related to any misunderstanding of doctrine, but instead lies in their tendency to send cases to the jury on weak facts even if the law is decided
correctly. But the doctrinal errors described in this section exacerbate
the degree to which this occurs. The plaintiff, not the defendant, should
have the burden of proof on the obviousness issue. Each plaintiff should
have the obviousness of product-related risks judged against an objective

standard adjusted to the class of users or consumers of which the plaintiff is a member. Non-obviousness alone should not trigger a duty to
warn of risks that are not created by the defendant's product. As we

shall see, obviousness is one part of the warnings litigation garden that
might be capable of producing healthy, helpful crops.8 6 Courts should be
especially careful to keep it free of weeds.
D. Confusing Risk-Reduction and Informed-Choice Warnings
Courts generally recognize that product warnings serve two distinct

but related functions. First, warnings may reduce the risk of productrelated injury by allowing consumers to behave more carefully than if

they remained ignorant of risks associated with product use.8 7 By behaving more carefully, consumers help to achieve the efficiency objective of

tort law. Second, warnings may provide consumers with the information
necessary to choose whether or not they wish to encounter certain kinds
of risks on a "take it or leave it" basis. While assuring more informed

consumer choices increases efficiency, it also reflects fairness concerns
more clearly than do risk-reduction efforts.88 Risk-reduction warnings
84 Courts that impose liability in these cases effectively are imposing a general duty to
rescue persons whom the defendants have in no way put at risk, something American courts
generally refuse to do in other contexts. For the argument that it is unfair to impose such a
duty, see Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 200-01 (1973). For the
argument that it is inefficient to do so, see Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. Legal Stud. 83, 11924 (1978). For the argument that process values support a no-duty rule in these cases, see
Henderson, supra note 31, at 928-43.
85 See text accompanying notes 193-203 infra.
86 See text accompanying notes 200-12 infra.
87 For classic examples of risk-reduction warnings, see, e.g., Powell v. Standard Brands
Paint Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 357, 212 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1985) (warning as to flammability of
paint thinner); Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976) (warning as to flammability of floor tile adhesive).
88 The courts developed an informed-choice action in products liability almost a decade
after the onset of the products liability revolution. The first case to refer to an informed-choice
theory was Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1973)
(asbestos), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Several early commentators distinguished between warnings to reduce the risk of harm-risk-reduction warnings-and warnings given
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cases are common to almost all product categories and form the central
focus of this Article. Informed-choice warning litigation is generally limited to prescription drugs and cosmetics, 89 although occasionally other
products are implicated. 90 As with all legal distinctions, the lines between these two types of warnings often blur. Even in a classic case of
the product user being able to use the product more safely thanks to clear
warnings, the user may also decide to decrease his level of usage in order
to reduce the residual risks of injury. And even when the warning says
"one out of one million people who take this drug become blind as
a
result," the consumer who chooses to go ahead and take it can be on the
lookout for early symptoms that might reduce the severity of his injury if
he turns out (inescapably, once he decides to consume) to be one of the
unlucky few. 9 1
The difference between risk-reduction and informed-choice warnings is closely analogous to the distinction between a medical malpractice
case premised on negligent conduct and one based on the theory of informed consent. The negligence case tests the reasonableness of the doctor's conduct. 92 It looks to risk reduction. The informed-consent claim,
while acknowledging that the standard of conduct was adequate (and
therefore that risk reduction is not involved), 93 questions the privilege of
the doctor to act at all without providing the patient with adequate information to decide whether he wishes to encounter the risk. Scholarship
simply to inform the purchaser that the use of the product involves a nonrcduciblc riskinformed-choice warnings. See, e.g., Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 9,
at 519. Others now recognize this distinction. See, e.g., M. Franklin & R. Rabin, Cases and
Materials on Tort Law and Alternatives 609-I1 (3d ed. 1983); J. Henderson & A. Twerski,
Products Liability: Problems and Process 365, 459 (1987); McClellan, Strict Liability for
Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion Through the Maze of Products Liability, Negligence
and Absolute Liability, 25 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 32 (1978). Considerable judicial authority identifies defendants' failure to provide for informed choice as a separate ground for a productsliability action. Many of these cases cite the language of Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A comment k (1965). See, e.g., Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1498
(D. Kan. 1987); Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 699, 677 P.2d 1147, 1152, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 870, 875 (1984); Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 380, 549 P.2d 1099, 1110
(1976); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind. App. 33, 55 n. 11, 388 N.E.2d 541,
555 n.l 1 (1979). In the case of unavoidably unsafe products, the user or consumer typically
can do little or nothing to reduce the risk of injury once the choice to use or consume is made.
s9 See, e.g., Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983) (tampon
and toxic shock syndrome); Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (deodorant); Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prod. Corp., 21 A.D.2d 197, 249 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1964) (deodorant), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 818, 231 N.E.2d 294, 284 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1967); see also cases cited in
note 88 supra.
90 See, e.g., Borel, 493 F.2d 1076 (asbestos).
91 Cf. McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974) (defendant has duty to warn of statistically insignificant possibility of injury to plaintiff).
92 See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 6, § 32, at 187-89.
93 See, e.g., Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989, 997-99 (M.D. Pa. 1981); Miller v. Van
Newkirk, 628 P.2d 143, 146-47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
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dealing with medical malpractice reflects an understanding that, with regard to standard of care and causation, the negligence standard used in

typical risk-reduction cases may not be appropriate for informed-choice
issues. 94 For example, considerable controversy exists regarding whether
the standard of adequate disclosure required of the physician to the patient should be that provided by a reasonable doctor 9" (the negligence
standard) or that expected by a reasonable patient (the informed-choice
standard). 96 Similarly, opinions differ strongly regarding the burden the
plaintiff should bear in establishing decision-causation: need the plaintiff

prove that he would have made a contrary decision had he been provided
97
with additional information?

94 See generally P. Appelbaum, C. Lidz & A. Meisel, Informed Consent: Legal Theory
and Clinical Practice § 35.65, at 112-29 (1987) [hereinafter P. Appelbaum, Informed Consent];
Prosser & Keeton, supra note 6, § 32, at 189-92; Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale?
Law's Vision, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 137, 142-43 (1977); Schultz, supra note 3, at 223-29; Note,
Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 Yale
LU. 1533, 1535 (1970).
95 Beginning with Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), courts have
held that the standard for medical disclosure is that amount of information which a reasonable
medical practitioner would provide under the same or similar circumstances. See, eg., Rush v.
Miller, 648 F.2d 1075, 1096 (6th Cir. 1981); Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 363, 409
P.2d 74, 86 (1965), modified, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966); Fuller v. Starnes, 268 Ark.
476,478, 597 S.W.2d 88,90 (1980); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226,228 (Fla. Dist. CL App.
1965); see also Annotation, Modem Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician's
Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.LR.3d 1008, 1028 (1978) (citing cases that measure physician's duty to inform by standard of what reasonable physician
would disclose under same or similar circumstances). This test almost invariably required
medical expert testimony as to what information a prudent doctor would impart to a similarly
situated patient. See, e.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, 11 Ariz. 542, 544, 534 P.2d 1052, 1055 (1975);
Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Haw. 188, 202, 473 P.2d 116, 121 (1970); Leyson v. Steurmann, 5 Haw.
App. 504, 705 P.2d 37, 44 (1985); Casey v. Penn, 45 Ill. App. 3d 573, 584, 360 N.E.2d 93, 101
(1977); Bly v. Rloads, 216 Va. 645, 649, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787-88 (1979). See generally Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Expert Evidence to Establish Existence and Extent of Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 52 A.LR.3d 1084 (1973).
96 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244-45, 502 P.2d 1, 10-11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,51415 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vessey, 110 R.I. 606, 627, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 282-83, 522 P.2d 852, 860 (1974), aft'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 152 530
P.2d 334, 334 (1975) (per curiam). Under the reasoning of these cases, a p3tient's right to
information is not dictated by a medical professional's assessment of which risks and therapy
alternatives are worthy of consideration. Courts which have adopted the "reasonable patient"
standard have also dispensed with the requirement that the plaintiff call expert witnesses to
establish the medical standard for disclosure. See, e.g., Canterbury,464 F.2d at 792; Cobbs, 8
Cal. 3d at 242-43, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513-14; Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 44647, 379 A.2d 1014, 1023-24 (1977); Small v. Gifflord Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt 552 557, 349
A.2d 703, 706 (1975).
97 Canterbury held that even if the doctor failed to disclose a material risk, liability does
not attach unless a prudent person in the plaintiff's position, if given the requisite information,
would choose against the therapy actually undertaken. See Canterbury,464 F.2d at 790-91;
see also Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17; Reikes v. Martin,
471 So. 2d 385, 392-93 (Miss. 1985). Only a small minority of the decisions following Canter-
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Compared with their medical malpractice counterparts, products
failure-to-warn cases reflect little judicial sensitivity regarding the distinction between risk-reduction and informed-choice warnings. 98 Courts
most often treat all failure-to-warn cases as of one cloth.9 9 However, it is
possible that if they fully appreciated the distinction they might, for example, be less willing to apply the causation presumption in risk-reduction cases. In informed-consent cases, where the function of a particular
warning would have been to empower the plaintiff by allowing him to
decide whether he wished to expose himself to the risk at all, secondguessing the decision the plaintiff would have made had he received the
warning defeats the objective sought to be achieved: to transfer the decision from the defendant to the plaintiff. 1°° In these cases, therefore, the
presumption for the plaintiff is justified. By contrast, when the role of
the warning is the more traditional one of risk reduction, the plaintiff's
burden arguably should be higher. In the context of pure risk-reduction
cases, the defendant's failure to warn constitutes less of a personal insult
to the plaintiff and more of a wasteful generator of social costs. To make
a valid case, the plaintiff arguably should be required to show that such
waste has, indeed, been caused by defendant's failure to warn-that, having received a proper warning, the plaintiff would have behaved differbury test causation by a subjective standard that seeks to determine whether a particular patient would have consented if she had been provided with the requisite information. See, e.g.,
Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979); Arina v. Gingrich, 84 Or. App. 25, 31-32,
733 P.2d 75, 79 (1987), aff'd, 305 Or. 1, 4, 748 P.2d 547, 548 (1988) (en banc); Wilkinson v.
Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628-29, 295 A.2d 676, 690 (1972). The use of an objective test for causation has been the subject of considerable scholarly criticism. See, e.g., P. Appelbaum, Informed Consent, supra note 94, at 122 ("By conditioning the availability of compensation on
the congruence between the patient's own decision and what a so-called reasonable person
would have decided, the objective test undercuts a patient's right of self-determination."); see
also J. Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 79-80 (1984) (voicing similar criticism);
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 87, 121 n.72
(1976) (same); Goldstein, For Harold Laswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent and the Plea Bargain, 84 Yale L.J. 683, 691 (1975) (same); Schultz,
supra note 3, at 249-51 (same); Seidelson, Lack of Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice
and Product Liability Cases: The Burden of Presenting Evidence, 14 Hofstra L. Rev. 621,
623-24 (1986) (same).
98 For an extensive discussion of the unique problems involved in litigating informedchoice cases, see Twerski & Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The
Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. I11.L. Rev. 607.
99 Courts, for example, indiscriminately cross-cite warnings cases without noting the distinction between risk-reduction warnings and informed-choice warnings. See, e.g., Reyes v.
Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1280-82 (5th Cir.) (informed-choice case citing risk-rcduction warning cases as authority), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Wooderson v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 235 Kan. 387, 402-06, 681 P.2d 1038, 1057 (risk-reduction warnings
case citing informed-choice cases as authority), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984); Bloxom v.
Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 844 (La. 1987) (same).
100 See Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of the Model of Decision, 53 Tex. L.
Rev. 1375, 1408 (1975).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

May 19901

FAILURE TO WARN

ently and avoided injury. We shall not opine at length on these policy
issues at this stage of the discussion. Rather, we simply note that the
case law has paid them little heed, and that greater sophistication is
required.
E.

The Garden Weeded- A Clean Failure-to-WarnDoctrine

For purposes of the ensuing discussion, we shall assume that courts
apply a failure-to-warn doctrine that is free of the conceptual errors identified above. The failure-to-warn cause of action, accordingly, is couched
in simple negligence, free from any reference to strict liability. Plaintiff
bears the burden of proof on causation and is helped by a presumption of
causation only if justified on the facts of the case. Defendants owe no
duty to warn of obvious dangers. Furthermore, courts differentiate
between risk-reduction and informed-choice cases and fashion doctrine
by taking into account the different policy goals appropriate to each
category.
Given this rather simple and straightforward doctrinal base, one
might expect that litigation should proceed without unmanageable difficulty. Indeed, some manufacturers might believe that, with such a cleaned-up version of the law, the millennium has arrived. However, as we
view the situation, we have merely cleared away the underbrush to reveal
still more difficult conceptual and doctrinal problems which arise when
this pure version of negligence law is applied to failure-to-warn fact patterns. As we shall make clear in the next section, the negligence framework in failure-to-warn cases, even when taken in its conceptually purest
form, raises insolvable judicial problems. Certainly it is not up to the
task of sorting out failure-to-warn claims in a rational, consistent, and
sensible way. Our objectives in the discussions which follow are to explain this doctrinal failure and to identify the steps necessary to restore
the integrity of decisionmaking in this important area of products liability law.
II
THE

EMPTY SHELL OF FAILURE TO WARN: THE ABSENCE
OF ADEQUATE RESTRAINTS ON JURY DISCRETION

We assume for purposes of this discussion that the fundamental doctrinal problems governing failure to warn discussed in the previous section have been resolved. The concerns we now address derive from the
fact that the plaintiff in a negligence case is required to establish the several elements of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.' 0 ' With
101See J. Henderson & R. Pearson, The Torts Process 11 (3d ed. 1988).
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respect to each element, the court must decide whether or not the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find in her
favor.102 For the liability system to achieve reasonably consistent patterns of outcomes and for courts to be able to prevent or overturn inconsistent and unfounded jury verdicts, the legal rules and standards must
be sufficiently specific, and must refer to facts that are sufficiently verifiable.10 3 Without adequate restraints on the exercise of unreviewable jury
discretion, the liability system drifts into lawlessness. The problem is not
that jurors are necessarily disposed to decide cases on whim. Indeed, we
are inclined to think that jurors try to do a good job, and we have no
reason to believe that the judge's instructions do not restrain jury behavior. But if the rules and standards of decision are so ambiguous that,
even upon review of the record by a judge they will support practically
any jury outcome, then the system itself tacitly permits, even if it does
not explicitly invite, jury lawlessness. 04
Our thesis is that, in sharp contrast to other areas of negligence and
products liability law, the standards governing failure-to-warn negligence
claims provide restraints on jury discretion that are so inadequate as to
be virtually nonexistent. As we shall explain in the discussions that follow, the problem is not so much that the standards are vague; vagueness
is a source of difficulty in negligence law generally, 0 5 but no more so
here than elsewhere.' 0 6 Rather, the problem resides in the fact that the
standards governing failure to warn too frequently rely on unavailable
data and unverifiable facts.'0 7
Before considering individually each element in a failure-to-warn
negligence case, a brief overview will be useful. As with negligence law
generally, the plaintiff's prima facie failure-to-warn case provides three
junctures at which courts may assess the adequacy of the claim: (1) preliminary risk-utility screening; (2) full-blown risk-utility balancing; and
(3) causation. Preliminary screening pertains to courts' initial, intuitive
assessments of the likelihood and severity of harm that a defendant's be102 Id. at 48-50.
103 See Henderson, supra note 31, at 901.
104 Justice Frankfurter made the following observation regarding the perceived tendency of

federal trial judges to send all Federal Employers' Liability Act cases to the jury:
The easy but timid way out for a trial judge is to leave all cases tried to a jury for jury
determination, but in so doing he fails in his duty to take a case from the jury when the
evidence would not warrant a verdict by it. A timid judge, like a biased judge, is intrinsically a lawless judge.
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 65 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
105 See Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 8, at 478-82.
106 See Henderson, Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 541, 542-47
(1976); Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 8, at 1559-60 n.121.
107 For a discussion of the problem of nonverifiability in tort litigation, see Henderson,
supra note 31, at 913-14.
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havior might cause. For most negligence claims other than those involving failures to warn, the place for a court to begin to assess the strength

of a plaintiff's claim is with the relative foreseeability, viewed ex ante at
the time the defendant acted, of the risk that materialized in the plaintiff's injury.108 Although precise quantification is never possible, courts
instinctively react skeptically when a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have recognized only a very remote risk of injury.10 9 Judges traditionally have taken negligence cases from juries due
to the remoteness of the risk, standing apart from other factors.' 10

Risk-utility balancing is the next logical place at which a court can
cast a skeptical eye on an arguably weak negligence claim. At this stage,
the court explicitly weighs the foreseeability of risk against the putative
costs of the risk-reduction measures."' When these risk-reduction costs
are relatively great and the foreseeable risks of injury are relatively small,

the court can and should resolve the case for the defendant as a matter of
law.

The third point in the plaintiff's prima facie case at which a court
applying negligence analysis can cull weak claims is in reviewing the cau-

sation requirement. Even if a reasonable defendant would have
discerned a significant risk of injury and would have taken suitable precautions to avoid that risk, the plaintiff may not recover unless the pre-

2
cautions would have prevented or reduced the plaintiff's injuries."1
The sections that follow examine each of these potential restraints
on jury discretion. We will show that in negligent failure-to-warn litigation, the restraints are virtually nonexistent. To accomplish our objec-

tive, we will compare and contrast failure-to-warn claims with claims of
defective design, showing how the two areas are fundamentally different
by highlighting the shortcomings of failure-to-warn doctrine.
108 Cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.)
(identifying probability of injury as first of three variables in famous negligence formula).
109 The best-known example of the independent use of risk foresecability is found in Palsgraf v. Long Island RR., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928), in which Judge Cardozo concluded: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."
Another casebook favorite is the early decision of the English Court of Exchequer, Blyth v.
Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Ex. 781, 784-85, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (1856) (water
company could not reasonably have foreseen bursting of pipes due to extraordinarily cold
weather).
110 See, e.g., Palsgraf,248 N.Y. at 344, 162 N.E. at 100; see generally Green, Foreseeability
in Negligence Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1401, 1403-17 (1961) (discussing English cases).
Ill See note 24 supra. The costs of risk-reduction measures are the third variable in Judge
Hand's negligence equation---"the burden of adequate precautions." See Carroll Towing, 159
F.2d at 173.
112 See, e.g., Ford v. Trident Fisheries Co., 232 Mass. 400, 401, 122 N.E. 389, 390 (1919)
(any negligence in company's positioning of rescue boat did not contribute to decedent's
death).
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PreliminaryRisk-Utility Screening

We use the phrase "preliminary risk-utility screening" to refer to a

court's initial assessment of the relative proximity or remoteness of a
product-related risk, measured by the probability of injury that a reason-

able defendant would have perceived at the time she acted. 1 3 To understand

how this preliminary screening process affects judicial

decisionmaking in failure-to-warn cases, we will first consider in the defective-design context how it helps courts decide which cases should not
reach the jury. This comparison is important because it highlights the
potential ability of preliminary screening to serve as an independent test
of the validity of plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims.

When a judge's initial assessment of a design claim reveals that, at
the time the defendant acted, the risk of plaintiff's injury was quite remote, a distinctive train of logic is set in motion. The judge knows that
design changes have risk-utility implications extending beyond the category of user and consumer represented by the plaintiff. Any design
change will have to be weighed against the possible increased cost it will
impose on the manufacturer, and against the new potential risks it will

pose for the consumer. Design changes, in other words, come in

"chunks," and the chunks tend to come in minimum sizes.1 14 The risk of
injury, therefore, must exceed some instinctive, judicially-measured
threshold of significance before a costly design change is evaluated under
full-blown risk-utility balancing.' 15
While every design change suggested by an injured plaintiff need not
require a complete product overhaul, even the smallest chunk of alternative design entails at least some degree of modification. An analogy to
writing and editing a paper helps to illustrate this point. Introducing a
new idea toward the end of a nearly-completed paper will almost inevitably require revisions at various earlier stages in order to maintain the
argument and logic of the piece. When the benefits to be gained by making this late addition are minimal, the writer may intuitively decide that

113 See note 108 supra.
114 This point anticipates a more robust discussion of the same issue in the next section,
which deals with full-blown risk-utility balancing. See notes 129-58 and accompanying text
infra. It can be understood intuitively by means of an example. Suppose that an injured plaintiff claims that a machine design should have included a safeguard against a bizarre accidental
injury. Even before the court seriously addresses the question of whether a safeguard is feasible and cost-effective, the court can assume in nearly every design case that the design change
will be at least "somewhat costly," and will implicate this user as well as others. If the accident is truly bizarre, the court may intervene and terminate the inquiry at this early juncture.
Assuming that only one person is likely to be injured, very remote risks are not worth pursuing
because the financial burden of redesigning the product is not cost-effective.
115 Two types of costs are avoided by resolving design cases early: transaction costs in the
form of expensive trials, and error costs in the form ofjudicially required design changes which
will not reduce the risk of injury to future consumers.
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it is simply not worth the effort to add the new section if doing so would
require reorganizing and rewriting significant portions of the paper.
Likewise, in design litigation, judges frequently determine at the outset
that an improved design which might have protected the plaintiff would
nonetheless require such costly and elaborate alterations that the change
simply does not merit a more careful analysis under full-blown risk-utility balancing. Judges can, and often do, wait to intervene until more

substantial risk-utility data are before them,1 16 much as an editor might
wait to abandon a proposed addition to a text until she had carefully
reviewed the entire piece. But when the relevant risks are remote, those

data (which, after all, are costly to obtain) may not be required in order
to reach, at the outset of the analysis, a principled decision not to impose
17
the change.1

In contrast to suggested alternatives in design cases, suggested alternatives in failure-to-warn cases appear to be easily compartmentalized.
Like additional memory chips which are used to expand the capacity of a
computer, warnings would seem to be added easily without requiring ad-

justments to the rest of the machine."" When a risk is perceived in the
context of an alternative design, it can be addressed only by a design
change which unavoidably affects other related risks and utilities and

thereby generates a not insignificant minimum threshold of avoidance
costs. But when a risk is perceived in the context of failure to warn, a
tailor-made remedy seems to be automatically available, precisely limited
to the category of users and consumers represented by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff argues that the manufacturer should share the information, however remote the risks it describes, with users and consumers.1 19 The rela116 See, e.g., Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, 562-63, 667 P.2d 750, 756-57
(1983) (summary judgment for defendant reversed; question whether defendant-manufacturer
should have designed power saw to work safely when used with a frayed, ungrounded extension cord required a trial).
117 See, eg., Elsroth v. Johnson & Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151, 164-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(summary judgment for defendant; no duty to design package against remote risk of tampering); Morrison v. Grand Union Forks Hous. Auth., 436 N.W.2d 221, 229 (N.D. 1989) (sum-mary judgment for defendant; no need for defendant-manufacturer to design battery-powered
smoke detector against remote risk that someone would use it without batteries).
118 This difference;, though seemingly intuitive, is essentially rhetorical. See text accompanying notes 130-50 infra.
119 In addition to arguments based on cost, plaintiffs frequently succeed at trial in characterizing risks previously considered unknowable as "knowable from the outset" by a reasonable observer. Simply stated, it is extremely difficult for a court to dismiss as a matter oflaw a
failure-to-warn claim on remoteness grounds when the plaintiff has introduced evidence that
the risk actually materialized in the form of the plaintiff's injury. Because the product did, in
fact, cause the injury, a court is sorely tempted to permit the inference to be drawn that a
reasonable product distributor should have foreseen the risk of injury and should have warned
against it. See cases cited in notes 204-05 infra. Thus the plaintiff will argue that at least some
additional information was obtainable and should have been shared with him in the form of a
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tive remoteness of the risk may create problems for the failure-to-warn
plaintiff when the court reaches the full-blown risk-utility stage of the
analysis-eliminating remote risks cannot justify much in the way of
avoidance costs. 120 The remoteness of the risk may also create problems
with causation-would telling the plaintiff about a remote risk have done
12
any good? We will address those problems in subsequent discussions. 1
But at the preliminary screening stage, the remoteness of the perceived
risk will rarely provide the court in a failure-to-warn case with an independent means of taking the plaintiff's claim from the jury.122 This
difficulty will occur because the plaintiff who claims that the manufacturer failed to warn, unlike the plaintiff claiming defective design, will be
able to tailor his suggested alternative course of conduct precisely to the
facts of his case in terms that have no immediately obvious consequences
for other aspects of production, marketing, and distribution. All the defendant must do, contends the plaintiff, is add slightly to his warnings.
On its face, the failure-to-warn claim is so modestly self-contained that,
even when the risk is remote, it nevertheless fails to trigger the preliminary risk-utility screening which courts give to design-defect claims
because the apparent unobtrusiveness of the plaintiff's request automatically counterbalances the remoteness of the risk. Thus, the relative unlikelihood of injury viewed ex ante loses its independent capacity to serve
123
as a basis for taking the failure-to-warn case from the jury.
In addition to revealing the contrasting screening approaches taken
by judges to design-defect and failure-to-warn cases, an examination of
preliminary isk-utility screening helps to highlight the possible blurring
of the risk-reduction and informed-choice warning distinction.' 24 Our
earlier discussion distinguished these two kinds of warnings and indicated that our analysis applies primarily to risk-reduction cases. 125 Nevertheless, one might be tempted to confuse this important distinction and
to respond to our risk-foreseeability arguments as follows: "Your analysis criticizes failure-to-warn jurisprudence for failing to support judicial
warning, even if information sufficient to justify massive redesign or withholding of the product from the market was not.
120 See note 115 supra.
121 See text accompanying notes 129-62 infra.
122 See, e.g., Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d 623, 626 (2d Cir. 1961), cited in
Wheeler v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 142 Wis. 2d 798, 812, 419 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Ct. App.
1987) ("if injury is likely to be serious, even slight foreseeability may warrant a finding that
prudence requires the manufacturer to take the small additional burden to warn"). Remoteness must be distinguished from obviousness. Many more decisions deny liability for failure to
warn as a matter of law on the ground that the risk is obvious than do so on the ground that
the risk is remote. See text accompanying notes 200-05 infra.
123 See note 119 supra.
124 See text accompanying notes 87-100 supra.
125 Id.
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interventions based on the remoteness of the risk of injury, standing
apart from other elements in the case. Your repeated use of the phrase
'apparent modesty' implies that plaintiffs are sneaking unworthy claims
past unsuspecting judges. Nothing could be further from the truth.
What your analysis overlooks is that users and consumers have a right to
know the complete truth about the risks to which they are being exposed
by defendants' products, however remote those risks may be. Nothing
less than their personal integrity as human beings is at stake."
This argument is flawed because it invokes informed-choice reasoning to respond to a risk-reduction analysis.1 26 Our analysis focused on
the potential of warnings to reduce wasteful accident costs, not to vindicate consumers' personal integrity. If failure-to-warn claims are viewed
as vindicating consumers' personal integrity, we ask that our hypothetical respondent describe and justify the appropriate measure of recovery
for such invasion. 127 In our view, traditional tort recovery should and
will follow upon the plaintiff's successful establishment of the elements
required to prove the need for an adequate risk-reduction warning. If
warning of remote risks does not reduce accident costs-and the informed-choice argument must concede that a given warning may not reduce such costs12 8-then we are justified in being skeptical even if such
warnings somehow enhance personhood values. In any event, it is inappropriate to support traditional tort recovery, which has risk reduction
as its central goal, with arguments that refer to the protection of intangible interests in personal integrity.
Of course, a different argument is available to our hypothetical
heckler, one that is based firmly on risk-reduction policy objectives: if
the alternative warnings sought by plaintiffs in remote-risk cases are, in
fact, divisible into interchangeable microchips, then it is only fitting that
judges not resolve cases for defendants at this early stage. If the additional chip turns out to add a sufficiently large increment of memory to
allow plaintiff to perform new computations-that is, if the remote risk
warning is cost-justified and would have saved the plaintiff from harmthe plaintiff's claim is, after all, valid, and the court should not resolve
these issues until examining the risk-utility and causation elements more
thoroughly.
126 For an example of a court committing the same error, see Wheeler, 142 Wis. 2d at 81112, 419 -N.W.2d at 336-37.
127 Presumably, one would place a value on the plaintiff's interest in personhood invaded by
the defendant's actions. For an extensive discussion of this issue, see Twerski & Cohen, supra
note 98, at 648-53.
128 If the invasion of the plaintiff's interest is a dignitary invasion akin to offensive battery,
it need not actually or proximately cause physical injury to be actionable. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 18 (1965) (offensive battery actionable whether or not it causes physical or
emotional injury); see also Twerski & Cohen, supra note 98, at 648-53.
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Our answer here requires us to anticipate, to some extent, what fol-

lows in subsequent discussions. What if,
we ask, it should turn out that
neither the full-blown risk-utility nor the causation analyses provide

courts with sufficient guidelines for screening out marginal claims? In
that event, the failure of preliminary risk-utility screening to provide an

independent basis for sorting out warnings claims would, in hindsight, be
regrettable. For now, we do not ask our readers to conclude whether or
not the failure of preliminary screening to act as a gatekeeper is necessar-

ily unfortunate. But if full-blown risk-utility and causation analyses
should prove to be slippery slopes heading for the jury, then this failure
of courts to engage adequately in preliminary screening will be cause for
regret.
B.

Risk-Utility Balancing

Even if the remoteness of the risk does not support the summary

dismissal of a weak failure-to-warn claim, one should expect that, when
the costs of making such warnings are explicitly considered in a risk-

utility balancing, judicial culling of weak claims can and will occur.
Courts should recognize that warning about relatively remote risks gen-

erates substantial social costs which in most cases outweigh any corresponding benefits in reducing accident costs. The most significant social
cost generated by requiring distributors to warn against remote risks is

the reduced effectiveness of potentially helpful warnings directed towards
risks which are not remote. 129 Bombarded with nearly useless warnings

about risks that rarely materialize in harm, many consumers could be
expected to give up on warnings altogether. 130 And the few persons who

might continue to take warnings seriously in an environment crowded
with warnings of remote risks would probably overreact, investing too

heavily in their versions of "safety." 1 31 Given these limits on the capacity of consumers to react effectively to excessive risk information, the

optimal, rather than the highest, levels of risk information, measured
129 See Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 9, at 513-17; Schwartz &
Driver, Workplace Warnings, supra note 56, at 54 n.71.
130 See Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 937-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Kerr v.
Koemm, 557 F. Supp. 283, 288 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d
695, 701, 677 P.2d 1147, 1153, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870, 876 (1984); Dunn v. Lederle Laboratories,
121 Mich. App. 73, 81-83, 328 N.W.2d 576, 580-81 (1983). For an excellent discussion of this
point relying on the work of cognition experts, see Schwartz & Driver, supra note 56, at 58-60.
131 See Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1441-42 (8th Cir. 1984) (Bright, J.,
dissenting); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1293 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974); Franklin & Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from
the Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 Calif. L. Rev. 754, 759, 774 (1977); see also, Pill Poll-National
Survey Finds Many Have Bad Information, The State (Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 6, 1985, at 2
(Gallup poll shows that Americans greatly overestimate the risks and underestimate the effectiveness of birth control pills).
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both qualitatively and quantitatively, are what is called for. 132
The mess courts make of risk-utility balancing in failure-to-warn

cases exemplifies the failure of the products liability system to reach, or
indeed even to aim for, optimal levels of risk information. Among the

factors contributing to the difficulties is the tendency for official decisionmakers-both judges and juries-to assume erroneously that warnings are virtually costless. 133 Because courts are accustomed to assigning
monetary value to the accident-costs side of the risk-utility calculus,13 4 it
is only natural for them to think in monetary terms when addressing the
avoidance-costs side. Unfortunately, the visible monetary costs of additional warnings are typically quite low-a few pennies for a bit more

paper and a little more ink-while the greatest part of the costs of
overwarning are nonmonetary and easily ignored. 135 Thus, it is hardly

surprising, but still regrettable, that in many failure-to-warn cases, the
risk-utility issue winds up improperly framed in the form of the question:
"Even if the perceived risk was relatively remote, would not a reasonable

person have warned against it, when doing so would have cost next to
nothing and might have prevented the plaintiff's injury?"' 136
To some extent, these misperceptions are avoidable. Judges, at
least, could learn to focus more carefully on the true costs of transferring
risk information to users and consumers. And they could, to some ex-

tent, communicate their concern to juries via stronger instructions. But,
in several respects, the difficulties in perceiving accurately the costs of
added warnings in failure-to-warn cases are intractable. Even if judges
and juries uniformly were to recognize the necessity for counting the true
132 The optimal level of product warnings is that level at which any more or any less information would increase the sum of accident costs and avoidance costs. Optimal warnings
would minimize the sum of these costs. For a treatment of this concept in the context of
products liability law, see W. Landes & R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 28084 (1987). For-an analogous discussion in the context of contract law, see A. Polinsky, An
Introduction to Law and Economics 25-36 (1983).
133 See, e.g., Wheeler v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 142 Wis. 2d 798, 819,419 N.W.2d 331,
339 (Ct. App. 1987) (finding cost to add warning in this case "insignificant"); see also Ross
Laboratories v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska 1986) ("The cost of giving an adequate
warning is usually so minimal, i.e., the expense of adding more printing to a label, that the
balance must always be struck in favor of the obligation to warn ... ."); Freund v. Cellofilm
Properties, Inc., 87 NJ. 229, 238 n.1, 432 A.2d 925, 930 n.1 (1981) ("Imposing the requirements of a proper warning will seldom detract from the utility of the product.").
134 Courts attach dollar values to accident costs every time they calculate damages awards.
See generally J. Henderson & R. Pearson, supra note 101, at 201-90 (discussing rules by which
harm to plaintiff is translated into dollar amount of damages).
135 Overwarning causes users and consumers to discount or ignore warnings that should be
heeded, leading to higher accident costs which, though very real, are not before the court in
failure-to-warn litigation. Overwarning also may scare some worthwhile users away, resulting
in wastefully high avoidance costs. See notes 129-32 and accompanying text supra.
136 See cases cited in note 131 supra.
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costs of warnings, the scientific and analytic tools necessary to identify

these costs are not currently available. In design cases, the most relevant
sciences are hard sciences-physics, chemistry, and engineering-which
are brought to bear on the issue of whether a safer alternative is both

theoretically possible and practically feasible. Markets exist in which
both the tangible (nuts and bolts) and the intangible (reduced efficiency)
aspects of the design problem are regularly priced. 137 And experts are
available who can translate both sides of the relevant risk-utility calculus

into workably comparable units of measure.138
In contrast to design cases, failure-to-warn jurisprudence has no
available body of hard science from which to draw the data necessary to
run sensible risk-utility analyses. In warning cases, attention focuses not
on comparisons between alternative methods of designing inanimate ob-

jects but on alternative methods of programming human behavior. The
relevant sciences tend to be soft, undeveloped, and largely under-uti-

lized. 139 Markets rarely exist in which risk information and the effects of
such information on behavior are routinely priced.1 40 And because even
137 Presumably the various safety devices and safer alternative designs are bought and sold
in markets that establish the relevant prices. Thus, one should be able to calculate the monetary value of reductions in efficiency generated by the imposition of safety requirements. This
could be done by observing the differences in price between different methods of achieving
higher levels of safety and the corresponding differences in demand for the various methods.
For example, assume that two safety methods for protecting a worker's hands from punch
press injury are equally effective and knowledgeable users are indifferent as between them. If
one method is priced at $100 per year, and another method is priced at $20 per year, then the
inference is fairly clear that the $20 method generates a cost of approximately $80 per year
which is not included in the price, for example, the device might reduce productivity by $80
per year.
138 See J. Henderson & A. Twerski, supra note 88, at 639-42.
139 For example, the vast body of decision-theory literature and expertise which deals with
how people process information, see, e.g., R. Nisbett & L. Ross, Human Inference: Strategies
and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (1980); Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) [hereinafter Judgment Under Uncertainty], has yet to surface in warnings litigation. For a discussion of the value of bringing this
expertise to informed-choice litigation, see Thompson, Psychological Issues in Informed Consent, in President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, 3 Making Health Care Decisions: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship 83 (1982). We do not assert that communication experts are not presently being used in failure-to-warn litigation, since
that is not the case. See text accompanying notes 230-45 infra. Our point is that much expertise has yet to be tapped and that courts need to become more hospitable to use of expertise
available in this area. See generally Schwartz & Driver, supra note 56 (providing an excellent
interdisciplinary evaluation of the difficulties of communicating warnings in the workplace
environment).
140 Two problems combine to eliminate the possibility for such markets. First, regarding
the generation of risk information through testing, etc., the fact that such information constitutes a public good causes its potential markets to disintegrate. Second, for risks known by the
producers to exist, but not made the subject of warnings, risk information can hardly be demanded by, nor can prices be imposed upon, product users who, by hypothesis, do not know
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the best experts are frequently unable to translate the relevant elements
into comparable units of measure, experts are less frequently relied upon

in failure-to-warn litigation. 141

Another difference between design and failure-to-warn claims con-

cerns the effects of adding the plaintiff's proposed alternative. In many
design cases, plaintiffs confront difficulties in trying to introduce a new
alternative safety feature into an existing design. 142 These difficulties
arise because competing alternative design features inherently tend to
crowd each other out. Thus, introducing a new feature into an existing

design usually necessitates rearranging other aspects of the design and
frequently requires rethinking much, if not all, of the existing design.

This feature, highlighted in the earlier "rewriting the paper" hypothetical, reflects what the authors have elsewhere referred to as the "polycentric" quality of design problems. 43 Simply stated, a polycentric problem
is one in which each of the elements is dependant on all, or most, of the
other elements, so that altering one element necessarily alters all, or
most, of the others. 144
Polycentricity is a handicap in the adjudication of solutions to design problems, because it defeats the types of arguments traditionally resuch risks exist. Occasionally, one might be able to point out a situation in which a product
user hires an independent expert to tell him about product-related risks not otherwise known
by him. Consumer publications that rate various products are one such example. But the
main purpose of those efforts is informed choice, not risk reduction.
141 Experts are frequently used in connection with the sorts of issues that failure-to-warn
cases have in common with design cases, including the nature of risks presented by the product. See, e.g., Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., Inc., 748 F.2d 740,745 (2d Cir. 1984). They also
are relied upon to explain the physical feasibility of conveying a message to the product user.
See, e.g., Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851, 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 865 (1975). However, courts rely on experts less frequently on the issues of the need for a
warning and whether a warning would have made a difference. Indeed, several courts have
explicitly held that expert testimony is not required on these central issues. Sec, eg., Marchant
v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 836 F.2d 695, 700 (Ist Cir. 1988); Streich v. Hilton-Davis, 214
Mont. 44,49,692 P.2d 440,443 (1984). Courts occasionally refuse to allow behavioral experts
to testify regarding experiments they have run on the warnings. See, e.g., Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 685 P.2d 218, 222 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
142 Perhaps the best example of the difficulties of mutually incompatible, alternative safety
features appears in Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971) (problems
with safety features of earth moving machine). This aspect of the case is analyzed in Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 8, at 1569-71.
143 See, e.g., Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 8, at 1534-39; Twerski, supra note 6, at 551-53. The "rewriting the paper" hypothetical appears at text accompanying note 116 supra.
144 Lon Fuller, to whom the authors are indebted for their introduction to the "polycentrie"
concept, described the problem by using the image of a spider's web. The strands of a spider's
web are interconnected; when one strand is pulled, a complex pattern of readjustments will
occur throughout the entire web. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv.
L. Rev. 353, 395 (1978).
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lied upon in that decisionmaking process. 145 For lawyers to be able to
urge upon the court a single right result, they normally must be able to
work their way through essentially linear chains of logic, resolving each
issue before moving on to the next. 146 However, polycentric planning
problems-such as, "Is this design reasonably safe?"-require a backand-forth mode of reasoning in which the parties are free to reposition
themselves on the various issues as each is considered in turn. Traditional adjudication accomodates such reasoning clumsily at best.' 47
Ironically, in the context of the present discussion, the difficulties of
design polycentricity also have a beneficial aspect, since they highlight
the necessity of engaging in difficult trade-offs and force the court to realize that even small design changes are not cost-free. As the polycentricity of a design problem becomes increasingly aggravated, and thus more
aggravating, the court is pressured to examine the plaintiff's claim carefully to see whether the struggle to accomodate the suggested design al14 8
ternative is in fact worth the effort.
Because the elements of an optimal warning package are less interrelated than are the constituent elements of a product design, problems
involving failures to warn are almost never as polycentric as problems of
design. 149 Plaintiffs, therefore, typically can fit suggested new risk information into existing warning packages without needing to rethink other
elements of the package.' 50
Ideally, the notion of optimal levels of risk information 5 1 introduces an outside constraint on the transfer of risk information, not
unlike the way in which the size of a phone booth constrains the number
(and size) of people who can comfortably fit in it. In that sense, when the
limits on the capacity both to give and receive warnings are reached, new
warnings crowd out existing warnings. 152 But because the elements of
most warning packages are related to one another in a linear rather than
a polycentric manner, a court will only be aware of the crowding problem if it knows what the limits on giving and receiving warnings are.
Until the court is aware that those limits have been reached, the
See authorities cited in note 8 supra.
See Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 8, at 1535.
147 Id. at 1536.
148 See, e.g., Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 22-23, 484 P.2d 47, 62-63 (1971).
149 See Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 8, at 1559 n.121.
150 Once one recognizes that the way warnings are understood is affected by the sequencing
of, and interrelationships between, the warnings, the "design" of the warning, so to speak,
begins to appear polycentric. But that is a nuance largely lost on judges.
151See text accompanying note 143 supra.
152 See Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The inclusion of each extra item [in a warning] dilutes the punch of every other item. Given short
attention spans, items crowd each other out .... ").
145

146
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nonpolycentric arrangement of the elements of the warning package allows the court to continue to add new warnings indiscriminately. The
court will not receive signals to indicate that difficult trade-offs are necessary, and indeed will effectively be making these trade-offs without conscious deliberation. Even a court which knows, in the abstract, that a

limit will ultimately be reached, has no immediate sense of whether the
case before it pushes the warning package beyond the appropriate

constraints.
Thus, the concept of optimal information should help judges recognize the potential cost of adding warnings. But, in contrast to design

cases in which the polycentric nature of the problem signals trouble the
moment a hypothetical change is introduced, 153 the size of the phone
booth in failure-to-warn cases is only rarely revealed by the facts of any
individual case. Defendants attempt to sketch the outer boundaries of
the optimal warnings constraint-that is, they try to show the limited
size of the phone booth-in order to argue that adding the warning sug154
gested by the plaintiff would exceed the limits of helpful information.
But here is where the lack of hard science and dependable data comes
back to haunt the courts with a vengeance. Convincing a judge and jury
that adding one more small person to the phone booth will exceed limits
which cannot be defined adequately is a task at which few defendants
succeed. 155
153 Once again, trouble is signalled because each element in the design is connected with the
others, as in a spider's web. See note 143 and accompanying text supra.
154 See, e.g., Broussard v. Continental Oil Co., 433 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App.), curt. denied,
440 So. 2d 726 (La. 1983). InBroussard,the plaintiff claimed that an electric drill should have
been accompanied by a warning that sparks inside the motor could ignite vapors in the air.
The court noted that the plaintiff's expert suggested ten different warning symbols which
could have been included on the drill surface, while the defendant's owner's manual listed
eighteen different warnings. In efflect, the court realized that the phone booth was too small.
The court stated:
[A]s a practical matter, the effect of putting at least ten warnings on the drill would
decrease the effectiveness of all of the warnings.... Unless we should elevate the one
hazard of sparking to premier importance above all others, we fear that an efrort to tell
all about each hazard is not practical either from the point of view of availability of
space or of effectiveness. We decline to say that one risk is more worthy ofwarning than
another.
Id. at 358. See also Vallillo v. Muskin Corp., 212 NJ. Super. 155, 161 n.3, 514 A.2d 528, 531
n.3 (1986) (warnings need not list every potential injury; they need only give general notice of
danger and conduct to be avoided). Broussard may not be a typical case, however, because
there the defendant could point to a physical constraint-the size of the drill. where the
constraint is not physical, but rather consists of the user's capacity to understand, a defendant's task is much more difficult.
155 But occasionally some do. In Thompson v. Petro United Terminals, Inc., 536 So. 2d
504 (La. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 537 So. 2d 212 (La. 1989), the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant should have warned against using electric lamps in a potentially explosive environment. An expert testified that it would be impossible to warn of every different environment in
which the lamps might be used. Impressed with that testimony, the court ruled for defendant
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The problems run deeper still. Even if the relevant behavioral sciences were more developed, and courts more inclined and able to employ

them seriously and intelligently, the very structure of our traditional system of adjudication steers courts in failure-to-warn cases away from optimal levels of risk information transfer. The difficulty, which we refer to
as the "seriatim effect," stems from the fact that courts address claims ad
seriatim, on a case-by-case basis. With respect to issues decided by triers
of fact, later triers of fact are not allowed to be guided by the outcomes
reached in earlier, unrelated trials. 56 The difficulties this presents in the
failure-to-warn context are significant, and are not limited to productwarning cases. 157 A possible solution to the difficulties involved in
sketching the boundaries of optimal information transfer, which the seriatim effect prevents, is to consider clusters of fact patterns involving a
given product at one time. 158 Were this possible, plaintiffs' cases might
supply collectively what few defendants in individual cases are able to
provide-a sketch of the range of warnings that the producer might have
given, and thus the beginnings of a sketch of the boundaries of optimal
levels of risk information. A court could more easily discern whether the
size limitations of the phone booth were threatened by any single petition
for admittance if it had some idea of how many people were asking to get
inside.
as a matter of law. See id. at 510-11.
156 See, e.g., Wild v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 752 S.W.2d 335, 338-39 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) (finding error for plaintiff's counsel to refer to outcome in unrelated case). Evidence of
prior lawsuits will be excluded unless the plaintiff can show that the issues and evidence are
similar to the case at bar. See, e.g., Powers v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 234 Kan. 89, 97-98,
671 P.2d 491, 499 (1983). But when the defendant "opens up" the issue of prior lawsuits, the
plaintiff may be entitled to introduce evidence of prior outcomes in order to eliminate possible
misimpressions. See, e.g., Sacks v. Roux Laboratories, Inc., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 672, 676, 521
N.E.2d 1050, 1052-53 (1988).
157 Punitive damages is another area of tort law in which this same effect is felt. Theoretically, courts should impose only a penalty that fits the "crime." But when a defendant is faced
with a series of penalties for essentially the same conduct-for example, the distribution of a
dangerous product without adequate warnings-the penalties may, in the aggregate, exceed
what is fair and adequate. But a court judging an individual case is hardly in a position to
achieve fairness in the aggregate. This position recently led United States District Court Judge
H. Lee Sarokin to issue an order refusing to impose punitive damages whenever a defendant
could show that such damages already had been imposed for the same product-related conduct. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1064.65 (D.N.J.), vacated, 718
F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989).
158 Even if courts were to consider clusters of fact patterns, the problems would still be
daunting. In a free market economy with an infinite variety of products, each differing from
one another in small increments, the problem of establishing optimal information for a particular product is extraordinarily difficult. The variation between similar products complicates the
information-transfer problem since consumers must come to learn and differentiate between
the characteristics of the various products. At the extremes, the differences, such as between a
Volkswagen and a Cadillac, are sufficiently great; however, the differences between a Buick
and an Oldsmobile, for example, might be too slight to communicate effectively.
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The problem with this suggestion is that, as we have already observed, tort claims are traditionally adjudicated adseriatim. 59 Each successive tribunal retains little or no institutional memory of what has
come before. It is as though many different decisionmakers are
presented, over time, with a sketch of a single phone booth in which
there appears to be room for several more people, with each decisionmaker being asked to decide whether different sets of candidates
should be granted admission. Each decisionmaker is aware that too
many persons should not, collectively, be admitted to the booth. But
none is told how many candidates there are in total, what the other candidates look like, or whether other tribunals have admitted them. Instead, a tribunal is told only to admit any particular candidate if, taken
together with all the other admittance decisions being reached independently, doing so would achieve an optimal telephone booth population.
Without access to what other decisionmakers are doing, and without the power to coordinate these efforts, each of our hypothetical tribunals faces a daunting task. Even if it knows that the optimal number of
occupants is, say, eight,'1 ° and that they should be chosen so that they
constitute "a compatible crew," 1 61 the seriatim effect renders the task of
reacting to individual petitions all but impossible. Given the difficulties
of measurement and verification we have described, the overwhelming
temptation, even for a conscientious decisionmaker, is to view a claim as
prima facie valid and thus to allow the jury to decide, putting off to another day and another place the uncomfortable task of "getting tough"
162
with plaintiffs.
C. Causation
Causation should, in appropriate cases, be the acid test of negligence
law. In theory, it should force a plaintiff to move from establishing the
defendant's violation of an abstract standard of care to proving the con159 See text accompanying notes 160-62 infra.
160 In actuality, of course, the constraint is never so specific,.

161 Compatibility is an appropriate analogy-it is vague and implies a touch of polycentricity. See notes 143-45 and accompanying text supra.
162 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 722 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir.
1984) ("It is for the jury to decide whether [defendant's] chosen method [of warning] was
negligent."); id. at 1523 (Hill, J., dissenting) ("courts should not be put to the task of conducting a trial each time a litigant suggests that, under some remotely conceivable set of facts,
he could recover on his claim"); see also Sanderson v. Upjohn Co., 578 F. Supp. 338, 339 (D.
Mass. 1984) (defendant warned of exact conditions which plaintiff experienced, but court refused summary judgment- "the adequacy of warnings accompanying a product usually is a
question of fact for the jury"); McMurdo v. Upjohn Co., 444 So. 2d 449, 451 (F. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) ("in all events, the adequacy of the warning is for the jury to decide and may not
be disposed of by summary judgment"), overruled, Felix v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 540 So. 2d 102
(Fla. 1989).
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crete effects of that violation on this plaintiff. By forcing an answer to

the question, "What difference would it have made in this case?" causation doctrine provides some quality assurance that the standard of care
has been established correctly. It is altogether too easy to theorize about

standards of care applied to society at large.163 But if it is likely that the
particular plaintiff's injury would have occurred in any event, then perhaps the gap between what is and what should have been is not as significant as was first thought-if it would not have mattered to this particular
victim, then perhaps the effects of the defendant's behavior on society at
large have been exaggerated. Even more importantly, causation reflects

fundamental fairness norms. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a faultbased, risk-reduction tort doctrine that would not require a substantial
connection between the defendant's fault and the plaintiff's injury. 164
Human activity is varied and filled with thousands of indiscretions, large
and small. We can sort them out only by testing them against a mean-

ingful causation standard. Because it serves as a filter for human
accountability, causation takes on a significant moral dimension in negligence law. 165
Once again, it is useful to compare failure-to-warn with design-defect cases. In product cases alleging defective design, causation doctrine

operates reasonably well. A plaintiff typically sets forth a hypothetical
alternative design and seeks to prove that, had the safer alternative been
in place, the injury would have been avoided or reduced. Many design

cases provide a rich factual background which helps to define the causation question. For example, motor vehicle design cases are generally supported by hard data such as auto speed, skid marks, trajectories, and the

like. 166 Similarly, in industrial machinery cases, where allegations of in163 For the argument that the negligence concept strains the limits of adjudication when
used in the abstract, and that particularizing the standard of care by means of the "reasonable
person in the defendant's position" perspective renders the concept manageable, see Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 8, at 468 (arguing that retreat from specific negligence concept to general liability principles threatens judicial processing of individual
cases).
164 See generally A. Becht & F. Miller, The Test of Factual Causation in Negligence and
Strict Liability Cases (1961) (analyzing role of causation in tort law); Wright, Causation in
Tort Law, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1735 (1985) (same).
165 One view holds that the simple fact that a person has caused harm to another is sufficient to consider imposing liability. The actor may avoid liability by justifying or excusing the
conduct in some way, but the fact that the actor caused the harm is the underlying source of
the obligation to pay. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 160-89
(1973).
166 See, e.g., Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 738 F.2d 126, 127-29 (6th Cir. 1984)
(litigation concerning defective motorcycle brake design included evidence of length of skid
marks, weather conditions, and design alternatives); Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950,
957-59 (3d Cir. 1980) (in defective-auto-design case, plaintiff's experts presented evidence that
accident would have been avoided by alternative design), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 957 (1981).
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adequate safety devices are often made, the injury-causing event is typid.ally not clouded in mystery: a user whose hand is caught and injured
can usually identify the physical characteristics of the machine, how her
hand was trapped, where she was standing, the work environment surrounding the machine, and so on. 167
We do not mean to suggest that the causation issue is never troubling in design-defect cases. It can be maddeningly difficult. 168 In the
main, however, its resolution does not depend on personal anecdote or on
a sensitive understanding of how consumers respond to information.
Hard science and the laws of physics dominate and, at the very least,

provide a structure for the debate. The role of human behavior in design
cases is thus narrowly defined. Often the very function of plaintiff's suggested alternative design is to eliminate reliance on fallible human responses by obviating the need for the product user to respond in a given
fashion. 169 In short, the causation issue in most design cases is rendered
manageable by hardware and hard facts.
In the typical failure-to-warn case, the very opposite is true. To establish causation a plaintiff should, in theory, be required to prove not

only that she would have read, understood, and remembered the warning, but also that she would have altered her conduct to avoid the injury.
How is the plaintiff to carry these burdens? No hard facts or scientific
data frame the question. A plaintiff typically can offer little more than

self-serving testimony and anecdotal evidence to establish her proximate
causation case. 170 Being purely speculative, the plaintiff's arguments at
See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehie Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 379-80, 348 N.E.2d 571, 573-74, 384
N.Y.S.2d 115, 117 (1976) (plaintiff injured by machine lacking safety guard); Knitz v. Minster
Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 460-62, 432 N.E.2d 814, 815-16 (plaintiff's hand injured by
mechanical press accidentally activated by unguarded foot pedal), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857
(1982); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 487.89, 525 P.2d 1033, 1034-35 (1974)
(plaintiff injured by board flung from industrial sander).
168 A subset of design cases that share many of the same "what would have happened if?"
characteristics of failure-to-warn cases involves the issue of "injury enhancement," most frequently encountered in the context of motor vehicle "crashworthiness." In those cases, courts
must struggle to determine what portion of a plaintiff's injuries were caused by the bad design.
See, e.g., Huddel v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1976) (plaintiff must calculate what
injuries would have occurred if nondefective design were used). Another type of design case in
which the causation issue resembles that in failure-to-warn cases involves the question of
whether the plaintiff would have used a safety device if the defendant had supplied one. See,
e.g., Matthews v. Hyster Co., 854 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 1988) (directed verdict for defendant where plaintiff alleged defective braking system but presented no evidence that plaintiff
would have used alternative system if one had existed).
169 See, e.g., Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 95 NJ. 263, 270-72, 471 A.2d 15, 19-20
(1984) (defendant's machine held defective for failure to protect plaintiff from injury caused by
plaintiff's own inadvertence).
170 See, e.g., Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726, 730 (Ist Cir. 1986) (proximate
causation established in failure-to-warn case by plaintiff's own testimony that he would have
heeded a warning if provided with one). But see Denkensohn v. Davenport, 144 A.D.2d 58,
167
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once state both the minimum and maximum case. The good causation
case and the bad are remarkably alike. If courts were to "get tough"
with plaintiffs on the causation issue, almost no one would survive a defendant's motion for summary disposition. And yet anything less than
getting tough sends most causation issues to the jury. Faced with choosing between these extremes, courts understandably defer to juries' discretion.171 The plaintiff's causation case is made excessively easy because
any other reaction would make the case unacceptably difficult.
If the plaintiff's prima facie causation case is too easy to establish,
the tools available to defendants to rebut it are almost nonexistent. Unlike design cases, in which defense experts are free to demonstrate that
the hypothetical design would have fared no better, the defendant responding to the causation issue in a warning case has little to say and
rarely finds it in his interest to say it. In many cases, the only factually
plausible, causation-related line of defense is the assertion that the plaintiff was either too lazy to have read or too dull-witted to have understood
a more pointed warning. 172 Thus, only a personal attack on the plaintiff's shortcomings can blunt the unverifiable anecdotal offensive. Yet
the cost to the defendant in potential jury displeasure at such an attack is
hard to overestimate.
If the plaintiff can establish causation by mere say-so, however, and
if the defendant is powerless to rebut, causation plays little role in establishing the actual validity of most failure-to-warn claims. Unfortunately,
the need to rely on anecdotal evidence is not likely to disappear any time
soon. The tribunal must construct a conceptual bridge between the absence of the desired information and the injury which plaintiff suffered, in
order to establish the necessary causal link. For this bridge-building process to have any meaning, the factfinder must be able to hypothesize as to
how the plaintiff would have used the missing information had the defendant supplied it. Such projection requires a model of how consumers
absorb this information and under what circumstances they alter their
behavior in response.
63, 536 N.Y.S.2d 587, 590 (whether duty to warn existed was issue for jury even though unlikely that plaintiff could have seen warning), aff'd, 75 N.Y.2d 25, 549 N.E.2d 1155, 550
N.Y.S.2d 584 (1989).
171 See cases cited in note 162 supra; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp.
1487, 1496 (D.N.J. 1988) (jury must decide whether habitual, heavy smoker would have quit
smoking if tobacco company had told her cigarettes were harming her health), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 883 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990).
172 See, e.g., Mampe v. Ayerst Laboratories, 548 A.2d 798, 801-03 (D.C. 1988) (claim
against drug manufacturer in failure-to-warn case dismissed where physician admitted he had
not relied on label in prescribing drug); Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 850-51 (La. 1987)
(although warning in automobile owner's manual inadequate, recovery precluded because
plaintiff testified he had not read manual).
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Constructing a credible causation model is no easy task. In fact, a
huge body of literature dealing with decision theory and cognitive learning suggests that predicting how additional information would have affected any given individual may be well nigh impossible. 173 A number of
factors make such predictions difficult. First, considerable empirical evidence indicates that many people do not process information in a logical
and predictable manner.1 74 Second, not only the type of information
presented, but also the manner in which it is presented can have a substantial effect on the decision. 175 Thus, unless we know the manner in

which the withheld information would have been transmitted, we often
cannot credibly predict its effect. Third, the prior beliefs and information
of a given individual significantly affect the impact on her decisions of
any additional information. 176 Unless we uncover the pre-existing base
on which the additional information would have stood, we cannot determine the effect it might have had.
A concrete example will clarify the nature of these difficulties. Re-

garding the effects upon behavior of the manner in which information is
presented, experimenters have discovered, not surprisingly, that the order in which information is presented has a significant impact on its perception by the individual who must ultimately utilize the data to reach a
decision. 177 Unlike suggested design changes, suggested alternative or

additional warnings cannot be comprehended by the user all in one piece.
The consumer must read warnings sequentially and digest them piece-

meal. As one moves from more important warnings to those of lesser
173 This argument is fully developed in Twerski & Cohen, supra note 98, at 626-48.
174 Among the more pervasive logical errors made in decisionmaking arm (1) underutilization of base-rate information, see R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 139, at 157 (explaining
"base-rate information"); Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 Psychological Rev. 237, 248-51 (1973); (2) erroneous assessment of multiple risks, see Tversky &
Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability
Judgment, 90 Psychological Rev. 293, 310-14 (1983); and (3) attachment of excessive weight to
easily accessible and memorable examples, see Tversky & Kahneman, Belief in the Law of
Small Numbers, 76 Psychological Bull. 105, 105-10 (1971).
175 Many aspects of the manner of presentation may have an impact on decisionmaking
including: (1) how the issue is framed, see McNeil, Pauker, Sox & Tversky, On the Elicitation
of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 New Eng. J. Med. 1259, 1259-62 (1982); Tversky
& Kalneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. 5251, 5254-70 (1986);
(2) the order in which information is presented, see Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note
139, at 14-15; and (3) the primacy of early information over information presented later, see
Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. Abnormal Soc. Psychology 258, 283-88
(1946).
176 Whether one will respond to new information is a function of how one calculates the
probabilities of risk from both the new and the prior information already in one's possession.
See T. Wonnacott & R. Wonnacott, Introductory Statistics for Business and Economics 542
(2d ed. 1977).
177 See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 139, at 172-75; note 170 and accompanying text
supra.
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urgency, the number of warnings that must be supplied increases exponentially at each descending level. The plaintiff typically asks for only

one warning-the one precisely relating to the risk that materialized in
his injury. But the defendant has the right to insist that other, equally

178
important warnings also not be obscured as a result.

Thus, when faced with the causation question at any level of risk,
one must ask not only how many warnings should have been given, but
how they should have been sequenced with regard to each other. If
warnings of similar magnitude could be comprehended by the user simultaneously, their relative positioning might be unimportant. However,

given that users cannot assimilate warnings simultaneously, warnings
must be arranged in a sequence. Sequencing inevitably denotes relative
importance and will have an impact on the weight a consumer attaches

179
to the risk.
It follows that resolution of the causation question in failure-to-warn
cases frequently depends on variables that cannot be resolved coherently
in the courtroom. For the analysis in a multiple-warnings case to make

sense, one must determine the sequence in which the hypothetical warnings should have appeared, and how the user or consumer would have
reacted to alternative sequencing. The former question may not be deterrinable,1 80 and the latter question is surely not litigable. We can only
conclude that the causation issue lacks substantive content in much of

failure-to-warn litigation. 181 Too often, causation is a mirage-whatever
178 See notes 158-62 and accompanying text supra.
179 See authorities cited in note 174 supra.

180 Admittedly, with regard to some products, some forms of plaintiff interaction with the
product may be so foreseeable and/or create a sufficiently high level of danger that they clearly
should receive precedent in a warning. Where, however, the disparity between one risk and
another is not gross, it is folly to pretend that risks can be ordered by performing a risk-utility
analysis for each individual harm to be avoided.
181The discussion in the text focuses only on decision-causation, i.e., how the plaintiff
would have responded to the warning had the warning actually been given. Professor Richard
Epstein argues that the causation issue is further complicated by a direct physical causation
problem. See R. Epstein, supra note 9, at 104. In drug warnings cases, for example, the plain.
tiff must first establish that this drug was the cause of her harm before she must show that an
adequate warning would have influenced her decision to take the drug. See id. Two causation
issues, therefore, must be hurdled as a predicate to liability. See id. The interplay between
these two causation issues must also be reckoned with. In discussing the dual causation issues
in informed-consent cases, Epstein argues that:
The complications involved in applying the [informed-consent] doctrine are both great
and unavoidable. The possibility of its incorrect application is quite substantial, In the
context of any given trial the plaintiff will only win, if he wins at all, if all manner of
doubtful inferences on questions of fact, particularly of causation, are made in his behalf.
Indeed the difficulty with this cause of action becomes apparent once it is recalled that
the plaintiff must show that the preponderance of evidence supports his entire cause of
action. It is (or should be) quite insufficient for him to demonstrate that he is 51 percent
right with respect to each of the individual elements of his prima facie case; if that is the
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the factfinder wishes it to be. 182
Given the difficulties of litigating the causation issue in these failure-

to-warn cases, the question arises whether it should be abandoned altogether in warnings claims. This question may well be moot, because the
courts have already effectively abandoned it: the willingness of judges to

pass most causation questions to the jury is evidence that they attach
little practical importance to the issue. In addition, the adoption by

many courts of the causation presumption 183 has almost entirely negated
the issue in those jurisdictions. 1 8
We began this section by observing that the causation issue should,

at least in theory, be the acid test of the validity of the plaintiff's claim.
Theory aside, it is clear that, for the reasons set forth above, causation

plays no such role in warnings cases. Courts have practically mooted the
issue because they lack any realistic way of adjudicating it. Thus, causation joins preliminary risk-utility screening and risk-utility balancing as
an empty doctrinal shell in failure-to-warn cases. This situation is deeply
disturbing. A plaintiff's prima facie case should not be capable of being

constructed from pure rhetoric. The analogy to a car with a gas pedal
and no brakes is not inappropriate, for there are no longer any effective
checks on a failure-to-warn claim. The drive toward liability is now almost unhindered.
Finally, we note that the gulf between design litigation and failureto-warn litigation is very great. In the design case not only does riskextent of his proof, then the probabilities of establishing the case as a whole are well
below what is required.
Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 87, 125-26.
But see Cohen, The Logic of Proof, 1980 Crim. L. Rev. 91, 94, 95-97 (arguing that probability
of conjunction is not an obstacle because each component must be proved separately to level of
a well-established inference); Williams, The Mathematics of Proof-I, 1979 Crim. L Rev. 340,
340-41 (probability of conjunction will not defeat claim; plaintiff need only meet burden of
proof for each issue separately, rather than being required to multiply separate probabilities
together).
182 See R. Epstein, supra note 9, at 106 ("Judicial deference to the jury does not solve the
proof problems lurking in the causation issue; it only removes them from public view.").
183 See text accompanying notes 50-54 supra.
184 Commenting on the situation in which the gap between the information provided by the
manufacturer and that which plaintiff alleges should have been provided is small, Professor
Epstein notes:
The presumptions that adequate warnings would have been causally efficacious
surely aids the plaintiff by easing his problem of proof, but it does so only at the cost of
substantial error. This position might be justified on the ground that, once it is established that the defendant is a wrongdoer, the burden of proof on causal issues should be
against, and not with him. Yet here the original conception of wrong is so tenuous that
use of this presumption requires the piling of indulgence upon dubious indulgence.
Where the causal question is not susceptible to any reliable proof whether direct or
circumstantial, the proper response seems to be to deny the action in its entirety.
R. Epstein, supra note 9, at 106 (footnote omitted).
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utility have true substantive content, but the causation issue is usually
determinable because it is developed through the kind of hard facts that
can be the subject of legitimate expert testimony.1 85 As a result, courts
handling design cases treat the causation issue seriously. They tend not
to favor the plaintiff with presumptions to help him overcome the proof
hurdle. 8 6 By contrast, in most failure-to-warn cases, the liability standard is without content and the causation analysis completely ad hoc.
The collapse of negligence doctrine as a guide to decisionmaking in warnings cases could not be more complete.
D.

Summing up the UnderlyingProblem

It remains to be considered how the problems we have just described
which underlie failure-to-warn claims distinguish those cases fundamentally from negligence cases in general. "Hard cases," goes the old saying,
"make bad law." In every field of negligence law, close cases arise at the
margin that are difficult to decide. But negligence doctrine is generally
worth preserving because it gets most clear cases right, and getting the
clear cases right more than makes up for getting some marginal cases
wrong. If the phenomena we have just described occur, similarly, only in
marginal cases, then our concern over failure-to-warn doctrine is
misplaced.
Are failure-to-warn cases different in this regard? We submit that
they are. Given today's legal climate, most failure-to-warn cases are
hard cases. In the current climate, typical defendants do not present
courts with paradigmatic cases of negligent failure to warn. Rather, suppliers reach decisions of whether and how to warn quite deliberately and
self-consciously. Serious risks that are not clearly obvious almost always
are covered by consumer warnings. For these risks, the costs of warning
are very small because only relatively few such warnings are needed. In
negligence contexts other than failure to warn, inadvertence and lapses in
judgment play a much bigger role and provide for more clear cases (or
cases more ripe for settlement). In warnings cases, on the other hand,
products suppliers do provide warnings for serious, non-obvious risks,
and thus plaintiffs who appear in court present close cases that are hard
185 See, e.g., Dykes v. Clark Equip. Co., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCII) 112,032 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(both sides used expert testimony to address causation issue in design defect case); Kelley v.
American Motors Corp., 130 Ill. App. 3d 662, 665-69, 474 N.E.2d 814, 817-19 (1985) (same).
But see note 168 and accompanying text supra (discussing lack of hard facts in "injury enhancement" design defect cases).
186 One exception to this general rule involves the so-called "enhancement of injuries" issue
in design litigation. See note 168 supra (burden of apportioning harm shifts to the defendant);
see, e.g., Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304, 325-27, 537 A.2d 622, 633 (1988)
(standard of proximate causation affirmed in design case; burden shifted to defendant to limit
liability once plaintiff had shown modicum of enhanced injuries).
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to decide. While this phenomenon is somewhat apparent in design cases,
it is more pronounced in failure-to-warn cases. Moreover, as we have
shown, design cases more readily lend themselves to being sorted out at
trjial. 8 7 In the failure-to-warn context, the lack of clear cases only exacerbates the doctrinal emptiness of preliminary risk-utility screening, fullblown risk-utility balancing, and causation standards.
III
COMPENSATING FOR' INSTiTUTIONAL INADEQUACIES:
SETrING THINGS RIGHT

In order to reconstruct an effective failure-to-warn doctrine, the failure-to-warn garden must first be weeded by eliminating the fundamental
doctrinal errors which prevent this area of products liability law from
reaching its objectives. 188 However, elimination of these doctrinal errors
alone is not enough, as was shown in Part II. The doctrine must be
wholly reconstructed, the very soil of the garden must be reconstituted.
Even an error-free failure-to-warn doctrine is fraught with problems. Indeed, they are sufficiently disturbing to suggest that failure to warn
should be abandoned and replaced with a more manageable and effective
means of reviewing the adequacy of manufacturers' efforts to convey risk
information. Such a drastic solution, however, presents a dilemma. We
believe no responsible system of products liability law can properly function without a cause of action which imposes responsibilities on manufacturers to warn consumers about hidden, product-related risks. Yet, once
one starts down the slippery slope of finding liability for failure to warn,
few brakes exist to prevent sending most, if not all, oases to the jury on
instructions which refer to nonverifiable events and generate inconsistent
verdicts. This inevitable slide to inconsistency seems to flow necessarily
from the fact that manufacturers are being asked unreasonably to rescue
consumers from their natural state of imperfect knowledge and understanding. For many of the reasons identified in this Article, common law
judges have moved with caution in creating exceptions to the general rule
of no duty to rescue others from peril.18 9 Perhaps what has happened in
failure-to-warn cases is that courts, uncharacteristically, have gone too
far in imposing an open-ended duty to rescue.1 90 As a result, courts have
187

See text accompanying notes 137-47 supra.

188 See notes 21-100 and accompanying text supra.
189 For a discussion of the process reasons underlying a cautious approach by judges to
extend the duty to rescue, see Henderson, supra note 31, at 928-43 (arguing that courts refuse
to impose general duty to rescue because such duty would lack a judicially manageable
standard).
190 The duty in warnings cases fits one of the traditional exceptions to the general no-dutyto-rescue rule: the defendant's conduct causes the plaintiff to be exposed to risk. See, e.g.,
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predictably encountered severe problems of claims management.
If this way of looking at failure-to-warn litigation is correct, one

possible solution to the difficulties would be to replace the existing openended approach of nonfeasance-based liability with a more limited approach based on misfeasance. That is, manufacturers' liability for patterns of information transfer could be limited to situations in which the
defendant actively misrepresents the product, rather than passively fails
to supply information about it.191 Presumably, this more limited approach would allow courts to impose liability for egregious failures to

warn that might be expected to arise if no threat of liability were in
place, 192 without putting courts on the steep and slippery slope we have
193
identified.

Although tempting, we believe that such a fundamental restructuring of existing law would be premature at this juncture. Instead, at least

until a more moderate, middle-ground solution proves unworkable, we
suggest that courts focus on the inadequacies of the present litigation
system and seek to address them with honesty and sensitivity. Our spe-

cific proposals are developed accordingly in the subsections that follow.
Their chances of success will depend on the willingness of courts to di-

rect verdicts when the appropriate criteria are met. The necessity of imposing occasional directed verdicts follows from our belief that, without
overt interventions by judges, there is no middle path out of the present
quagmire. But perhaps the hope for a middle ground is not fantasy. Until recently, courts had shown no inclination to reverse the momentum,

built up over more than twenty years, toward expanding products liabilTubbs v. Argus, 140 Ind. App. 695, 698-700, 225 N.E.2d 841, 842-43 (1967) (no common law
duty to rescue generally, but affirmative duty imposed when defendant controlled instrumentality causing injury). But for the reasons we have described, the courts are unable to determine with any consistency the adequacy of various defendants' efforts to rescue.
191See generally J. Henderson & A. Twerski, supra note 88, at 119-32 (discussing tort of
misrepresentation in products liability context).
192 The clear cases of misfeasance, at least, must be dealt with. Although the distinction
between misfeasance and nonfeasance can be difficult to draw, courts might be expected to
stretch the concept of "misrepresentation" to encompass some of the clearer instances of defendants' failures to warn of high-level, hidden risks. See, e.g., St. Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta
Constr. Co., 21 111. App. 3d 925, 956-57, 316 N.E.2d 51, 73-74 (1974) (manufacturer who
knowingly misrepresented safety characteristics of product held liable). Under this misfeasance test, when a distributor sells a product without warning of a serious risk attending a
foreseeable pattern of use or consumption, she may be found to have represented impliedly
that the product was safe for that foreseeable pattern of use or consumption. Compared with
nonfeasance-based failure to warn, however, it would be more difficult for courts to stretch the
misfeasance-based concept to reach the sorts of intuitively doubtful cases described in this
Article.
193 Although misrepresentation may stretch to capture some failures to warn, it will not
even begin to stretch as far as the open-ended "rescue the plaintiff from ignorance" principle
underlying failure-to-warn doctrine.
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ity further and further. A recent empirical study of products liability
decisionmaking indicates, however, that courts may at last be receptive
to change. 194 Although this new receptivity has yet to manifest itself
clearly in published warnings decisions,195 that may be merely a function
of the inherent and daunting difficulties we have described rather than
any principled commitment by judges to continue with business as usual
in warnings cases. Armed with the agenda to which we now turn, and
carried along by the newly manifested willingness to rethink older patterns of decisionmaking, courts may yet be able to bring much-needed
196
order to failure-to-warn litigation.
Courts face three major tasks in redressing the inadequacies of the
present failure-to-warn doctrine. First, they must refuse to impose liability merely for defendants' failures to add insignificant increments of information to their communications with consumers. Second, courts
must acknowledge their own inability to grasp the totality of warnings
problems by deferring more readily to other decisionmakers who do possess the institutional capability to assess warnings as a whole. Third,
courts must demand greater procedural rigor in the litigation process,
directing verdicts more readily in unworthy cases.
A.

Refusing to Impose Liabilityfor Failureto Include Insignificant
Increments of Information

Earlier we described the relative ease with which plaintiffs can press
upon courts their need for tiny increments of additional information that
might have helped them to avoid injury. 197 We also noted the difficulties
194 See Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical
Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479, 498-533 (1990) (examining both trial and
appellate court products liability decisions). The Henderson & Eisenberg study reveals a dramatic reversal in favor of defendants in products liability litigation from the mid-19803 to
1989. See id. at 539. The authors found the turnaround statistically significant. See id. at 540.
Defendants' success rate applied to a broad range of products liability issues, with the exception of failure-to-warn cases. See id. at 489-98.
195 Id. at 496. One of the authors of this Article co-authored the Henderson & Eisenberg
empirical study, discussed in note 194 supra. To test the hypothesis that courts have not yet
begun to turn the comer in favor of defendants in failure-to-wam cases, the same inquiries
were run on published failure-to-warn decisions as were run in the study on all published
products decisions. See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 194, at 498-516. Because the
numbers are small (566 total decisions over a six-year period, or an average of 96 per year), the
results are necessarily inconclusive. But no pro-defendant trends are apparent in recent years.
See id.
196 Early writers on the subject of failure to warn suggested that in order to provide greater
certainty in the law, the judiciary may have to play a more active role in administering warning standards. See Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to
Warn, 41 Va. L. Rev. 145, 178-80 (1955) (asserting that judiciary is best institution to balance
social security with social progress).
197 See text accompanying notes 118-23 supra.
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encountered in fairly establishing causation for such small informational
increments. 198 In addition, we argued that as product warnings address
each new level of risk, the lists of warnings become increasingly longer
and consumer focus more attenuated and difficult. 199 We see no solution
to these problems unless judges begin adopting a hardheaded attitude
toward such claims. Courts simply should refuse to hold defendants liable for their failure to include one more tiny piece of information. Several types of claims, especially those involving obvious dangers, low risk
foreseeability, and minor verbal shadings, must be approached with a
firm anti-liability presumption.
1.

Obvious-DangerCases

Although most courts agree that product suppliers owe no duty to
warn of open and obvious dangers, 20 0 some courts have committed doctrinal errors in administering this obvious-danger rule.20 1 In this section,
we shall assume that the overarching doctrinal problems addressed in
Part I have been resolved, and that courts are trying to till a properly
weeded garden. Our focus here is more practical than theoretical. At
what point does a danger become sufficiently obvious that a warning is
not necessary? More importantly, who decides the issue of obviousness-the judge or the jury?
We note at the outset that some courts are prone to characterize
risks as non-obvious for reasons that we believe to be illegitimate. This
sort of mischaracterization occurs most frequently in two categories of
cases. The first category consists of cases in which courts label an arguably obvious risk as non-obvious simply to allow a plaintiff whose designdefect claim has failed a chance to recover on a warning claim. It is
standard practice for products liability plaintiffs to allege and attempt to
prove both a design defect and a failure to warn in the same case. As we
noted earlier, in order to make out a legitimate design-defect case, a
plaintiff must identify a feasible design alternative that would have prevented or lessened the plaintiff's injury.20 2 With considerable frequency,
however, plaintiffs' proof on the alternative design falls short of the
mark. Especially when the plaintiff's injuries are serious, courts are
tempted to allow the warning claim to fill the breach. In order to give
this "deserving" plaintiff an opportunity to recover, the court will take a
danger that appears to be fairly obvious (and thus not a subject which
requires a warning) and hold it to be arguably non-obvious, at which
See
199 See
200 See
201 See
202 See
198

text accompanying
text accompanying
cases cited in note
text accompanying
text accompanying

notes 165-76 supra.
notes 129-32 supra.
57 supra.
notes 57-84 supra.
notes 142-44 supra.
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point the warning claim is submitted to the jury.2°3 Such a claim is
neither fish nor fowl. A smidgeon of design defect and a dash of failure
to warn should not suffice for recovery. Two separate claims, neither of
which alone legitimately provides a basis for recovery, can hardly in
combination overcome their separate deficiencies and thus allow recovery. A plaintiff who does not legitimately establish a design case by qualified expert testimony should not be awarded an illegitimate failure-towarn recovery as a consolation prize by a court's mislabeling of an obvious risk as non-obvious.
The second category of cases in which courts improperly characterize obvious risks as non-obvious results when courts reason by hindsight.
Some courts decide the issue of whether a danger is obvious by reasoning
203 See, e.g., Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 747-48 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding finding for defendant on design allegation but for plaintiff on failure to warn of stability of highly dangerous Jet Ski); Long v. Deere & Co., 238 Kam. 766, 771-74, 780, 715 P.2d
1023, 1027-30, 1033 (1986) (upholding both finding of no design defect and finding of failure to
warn, even though missing information was common knowledge among users); Ingram v. Caterpillar Mach. Corp., 535 So. 2d 723, 728-30 (La. 1988) (finding design defect claim unsuccessful but upholding failure-to-warn claim of employee who did not jump from forklift during
lateral overturn).
A similar phenomenon is evident in cases in which courts have denied a plaintiff recovery
on a design claim and then stretched to find a failure-to-warn claim that would support recovery. See, e.g., Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minm. 1986) (upholding
jury finding of no defective design but finding breach of duty to warn of foreseeable misuse).
In one striking case, the plaintiff had not read the owner's manual which warned against parking his car, equipped with a catalytic converter, over easily combustible material See Dalton
v. Toyota Motors Sales, Inc., 703 F.2d 137, 138-39 (5th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff parked the
car in just this manner, left the engine running, lit a cigarette, and fell asleep. See id. Plaintiff
was burned in the ensuing fire and sued the automobile manufacturer on a products liability
claim. See id. at 138. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit overruled a trial court's j.rmo.v. and reinstated the jury's verdict that the catalytic converter on the 1978 Toyota automobile was defectively designed as well as that the manufacturer had failed to warn adequately about the
danger of parking the car over dry grass. See id. at 141 & n.2. The concurring opinion,
discussing the dubiousness of the verdict and the modesty of the evidence supporting it, is
quite revealing:
While the evidence adduced supports the jury's verdict with respect to the cause of
the fire, Le., the catalytic converter, I do have concerns about the lack of evidence dealing with the alleged inadequacy of the warning contained in the owner's manual These
concerns are heightened by the weakness of the plaintiff's case with respect to an inherently defective design in the automobile, that is, the placement of the catalytic converter
and the failure to provide safety features which could have prevented the fire. The plaintiff's case was nonexistent with respect to the defective nature of the catalytic converter
itself. Where, as here, minimum evidence of inherent defectiveness of the product is
presented, a lesser warning may be held adequate than in cases where the proof of defectiveness, and hence dangerousness, of the product is greater ....
Rather than presenting testimony bearing on the duty to provide a warning commensurate with the degree of danger presented, the plaintiff did little here other than to
point out the fact that the warning was contained in the owner's manual and that no
other warning was given to him.
Id. at 142 (Jolly, J., concurring). Despite these reservations, the concurring opinion declined
to state that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the warning was inadequate. See id.
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backwards from the fact of the plaintiff's injury. When a plaintiff is
badly injured, it is not irrational to assume that the plaintiff did not fully
appreciate the danger. If he had, the likelihood is that he would have
avoided it. From this premise, it is a small jump to conclude that the
product could not have been obviously dangerous. In some decisions this
reasoning is explicit, 20 4 in others implicit. 20 5 Whether explicit or implicit, determination by hindsight is an inappropriate basis for labeling a
risk non-obvious. No form of product communication will be read and
heeded by every consumer. Even screechingly explicit warnings will be
disregarded by some. Reasoning from the mere fact of the plaintiff's
injury, which resulted in a lawsuit, to the necessity for a warning, threatens to subvert the obvious-danger rule. It equates the bare fact of the
plaintiff's injury with the legal conclusion of non-obvious danger.
Putting to one side the doctrinal errors and the instances in which
courts are illegitimately motivated to bypass the obvious-danger rule, 20 6
a core of cases remains which requires careful attention. In every case
involving arguably obvious dangers, a court must decide when to direct a
verdict for the defendant and when to send the case to the jury. We
conclude that too many cases make their way to juries. This pattern
might be more acceptable if the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim was
otherwise subject to fair and efficient judicial screening. However, in
light of the almost total collapse. of failure-to-warn doctrine detailed
above, 20 7 the obviousness test for risks must be employed more rigorously by courts as a screening device. Although courts readily acknowledge in the abstract that defendants need not warn of obvious risks,
courts sometimes find it hard to resist the conclusion that, in any given
case, an additional increment of information might have been useful no
matter how intuitively obvious the danger. Perhaps the product user or
consumer did not really know what he was getting into. Perhaps a bit
more information, presented a bit more forcefully, would have made a
difference.
The speculative nature of such an approach is devastating. Spurred
by this underlying fear, courts have sent to trial and to juries cases
204 For one example of explicit reasoning, see Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 578 F. Supp. 1429,
1431-32 (E.D. Pa. 1983). In Conti, the husband inadvertently started his car in gear, and ran
over the plaintiff, his wife. The court found that the husband would not have done so if the
risk had been obvious. Conti was later reversed. See 743 F.2d 195 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 470

U.S. 1028 (1985).

205 For one example of implicit reasoning, see Pettis v. Nalco Chem. Co., 150 Mich. App.
294, 302-03, 388 N.W.2d 343, 348 (1986) (workers poured molten steel into mold containing
chemical which exploded; court found they would not have done so if risk of explosion had
been obvious).
206 See text accompanying notes 60-86 supra.
207 See text accompanying notes 101-87 supra.
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against manufacturers for failure to warn of patently obvious dangers
such as failure to warn that diving into the shallow end of a swimming
pool can cause serious injury, 20 8 failure to warn that attempting to lift a

315-pound cafeteria table by oneself may cause back strain,20 failure to
warn that it is dangerous to tow a person riding in an inner tube in a
crowded river at very high speed, 2 10 and failure to warn that drinking
211
massive quantities of tequila within a short time can cause death.

These are not isolated examples. The reporters abound with them.212 To
prevent the continuance of such absurd claims, the standard of obvi-

ousness must rise. A judicial mind-set must be developed that does not
allow sending such marginal claims into the relatively unfettered hands
of a jury. A robust interpretation of the obvious-danger rule is a necessary predicate to a sane failure-to-warn world.
2. Low-Foreseeability Cases

Courts rarely use low or remote risk foreseeability as an independent
basis for dismissing failure-to-warn products cases. As we noted earlier,

no obvious monetary costs counterbalance what appear to be costless additional warnings. 21 3 Furthermore, the level of credibility of the exis-

tence of the risk need not be substantial. Once again, no one is being
asked to do anything other than spill a little ink and reveal the doubt to
consumers. But the numbers of remote risks that must be warned about
(especially when considering those with low credibility thresholds) are

substantial. If courts are to deal with this problem responsibly, they
must be prepared to treat low risk foreseeability as an independent fac208 See, e.g., Corbin v. Coleco Indus., 748 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1984) (genuine issue of
material fact whether risk of bellyflapping into shallow water obvious); Erickson v. Muskin
Corp., 180 IM.App. 3d 117, 120, 535 N.E.2d 475, 478 (1989) (duty to warn of risks of diving
through inner tube into shallow pool); Glittenberg v. Wilcenski, 174 Mich. App. 321, 326, 435
N.W.2d 480, 482, appeal granted in part, 433 Mich. 878, 446 N.W.2d 168 (1989) (risk of
diving into shallow end of pool not obvious even though plaintiff experienced swimmer).
2W See, e.g., Strain v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 534 So. 2d 1385, 1389 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding jury could find table defective on either dangerous-design or failure-to-warn grounds), cert.
denied, 537 So. 2d 1165 (La. 1989).
210 See Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 512 (N.D. 1989) (affirming as proper jury question
whether rubber tube unreasonably dangerous because of lack of warnings).
211 See Brune v. Brown Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (genuine
issue of material fact whether tequila safe for intended use without instructions describing safe
use).
212 See, e.g., Yaeger v. Stith Equip. Co., 177 Ga. App. 835, 836-37, 341 S.E.2d 492, 493
(1986) (risk not obvious when top heavy vehicle labeled "all terrain vehicle" tipped over on
steep slope) (emphasis added), aff'd after remand, rev'd on other grounds, 185 Ga. App. 315,
364 S.E.2d 48 (1987); Books v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 362 Pa. Super. 100, 109, 523
A.2d 794, 799 (1987) (while plaintiff knew of danger of contact with power lines, risk of deetrical arcing without actual contact between lines and plaintiff's truck not obvious).
213 See text accompanying notes 118-23 supra.
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tor. The sacrifice in terms of consumer safety is likely to be small. Consumers who understand the true remoteness of these kinds of risks are
not likely to pay them much heed. Most normal people sensibly refuse to
account for highly remote risks in their daily conduct. 2 14 The only way
to assure that consumers will take these types of risks into account is for
product distributors to exaggerate their frequency by highlighting them
in product warnings. Not only would such remote risk warnings crowd
out potentially useful warnings but they would also focus consumer attention on the fairy tale bogeyman. One cannot cry wolf without paying
the price over the long term.
3.

Specificity-of-Warning Cases

A fair number of warning claims concern themselves with what can
fairly be characterized as the relative specificity of warnings. In one
much-cited decision, 21 5 the plaintiff suffered paralysis from a stroke allegedly caused by an oral contraceptive. The plaintiff claimed that the
warnings were inadequate because they did not mention the word
"stroke." The appellate court held that the adequacy of the warning
given by defendant-that the birth control pills could cause "abnormal
blood clotting which can be fatal," and that the user was subject to the
increased risk of blood clotting in such "vital organs as the brain"presented a question for the triers of fact. 2 16 The court opined that a jury
might conclude that the failure of the manufacturer specifically to mention the risk of a "stroke" minimized the warning's impact. The deficiency was not cured by the fact that the warnings given emphasized the
risk of death, since a jury might conclude that permanent disability was a
2 17
fate worse than death.
A later version of the birth control pill warning, developed after the
above-mentioned decision, did warn of the possibility of stroke specifically.21 8 The later warning clearly demonstrates the difficulty of formulating alternatives which are somewhat more graphic. It told "of the
serious side effects of oral contraceptives, such as thrombophlebitis, pulmonary embolism, myocardial infarction, retinal artery thrombosis,
stroke, benign hepatic adenomas, induction of fetal abnormalities, and
214 This is the sensible assumption underlying much of the instrumentalist analysis of tort
law. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 166 (3d ed. 1986). It also has been supported
empirically. See Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of
Torts, 9 J. Legal Stud. 463, 491 n.48 (1980).
215 MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65, cert. denied,
474 U.S. 920 (1985).
216 Id. at 141, 475 N.E.2d at 71.

217 Id., 475 N.E.2d at 72.
218 Id. at 134 n.6, 475 N.E.2d at 67 n.6.
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gallbladder diseases." 219 Once the warning moves from the general to
the specific, it becomes necessary to list all risks of the same or similar
magnitude. One rightfully wonders whether this last-quoted laundry list
is more effective for someone in the position of the above-described plaintiff than the earlier warning that referred more generally to blood clotting
causing serious injury or death.
The foregoing decision and others like it, ° which impose liability
for the failure of defendants to be slightly more specific, would seem to
run afoul of the requirement that causation be proved. One may seriously doubt whether such minor differences in wording would really affect a consumer's behavior. Alternative formulations that are more

specific may require greater elaboration to reflect honestly the dangers
presented by the more finely honed articulation. Courts would do well to

approach this genre of warning cases with healthy skepticism.
B.

Defering to Institutions Capable of Evaluating

Warnings in the Aggregate
In an earlier discussion we raised the problem of the seriatim effect
indigenous to our tort litigation system. We suggested that one way of
219

Id.

See, eg., Uptain v. Huntington Laboratory, Inc., 685 P.2d 218, 219-20 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984), aff'd, 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1986) (plaintiff suffered severe burns on hands from contact
with caustic cleaner labeled on one side of container with word "poison" in large red letters
between two skull and cross-bones logos and labeled on other side, in smaller letters, with
"Danger: Corrosive... Produces chemical burns. Do not get in eyes, skin, or on clothing;"
court held that adequacy of warning was for jury to decide); Pll v. Victor J. Andrew High
School, 123 i. App. 3d 423, 428, 462 N.F.2d 858, 861 (M1 App. CL 1984) (plaintiff broke
spine when she bounced off of mini-trampoline while doing gymnastic exercises in high school
class; label on trampoline read, "Caution. Misuse and abuse of this trampoline is dangerous
and can cause serious injuries.... Any activity involving motion or height creates the possibility of accidental injuries.... Use without proper supervision can be dangerous and should not
be undertaken or permitted," whether label should specifically mention severe spinal injury
forjury to decide); Gines v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 516 So. 2d 1231, 1233-35 (La. Ct.
App. 1987) (wood stove flue pipe came loose from stove when roof of house repaired, suffocating occupants; instructions with stove said to make sure connection between flue pipe and
stove was secure and to follow local building codes; whether instructions should have specifically told professional installer to use metal screws to secure pipe was for jury to decide), cert.
denied, 519 So. 2d 127 (La. 1988); Chausse v. Alean Ingot & Powders, Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 11,898 (D. Mass. 1988) (aluminum powder exploded from static sparks; drum containing powder said "EXPLOSION HAZARD CONTAINS FINELY DIVIDED ALUMINUM FLAKE POWDER. Avoid dust conditions which can form explosive mixtures. Use
non-sparking handling equipment which is electrically grounded... ;" for jury to decide
whether label also should have told user to wear non-static clothing and shoes); Lewis v.
Wating Ladder Co., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) T 11,228 (Tenn. CL App. 1986) (bottom of
extension ladder slipped on wet, smooth concrete; label on ladder said "when ... ladders are
erected on a surface where there is a hazard of slipping, users should equip with shoes, lash in
place, or have another person hold ladder," whether label also should have specifically warned
against wet, smooth concrete held for jury to decide).
2W
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dealing with the extraordinary difficulties involved in sketching the

boundaries of optimal information transfer would be to consider simultaneously clusters of fact patterns involving a given product or product
type. Although we acknowledged that the seriatim effect is too deeply
ingrained in our judicial system to allow courts to accomplish the desirable clustering, courts could at least pay more serious attention to con-

clusions reached by those who possess the institutional capability of
evaluating warnings in the aggregate. However, for reasons that we find

difficult to understand, courts have not deferred to the determinations of
product safety agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration or

Consumer Product Safety Commission. 22 1 The analysis usually begins

and ends with the statement that agency standards are minimum, not
maximum, standards and that courts are therefore free to disregard
222
them.
We submit that this approach is misguided. The problem of determining the proper wording of a warning may not necessarily require expertise to be solved. But perceiving and judging the wide spectrum of

possible warnings does require significant expertise. Furthermore, it is
the kind of expertise that is not easily transferrable to the judicial theater.

The knowledge sought is not the knowledge of an isolated fact or judg221 Two arguments have been advanced by defendants. First, they have argued that federal
regulation preempts state law. The overwhelming majority of courts have refused to find federal preemption, either express or implied. See, e.g., Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844
F.2d 1108, 1112 n.1 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 260 (1988) (federal law did not
preempt Virginia common law liability for defective design or failure to warn); Finn v. Searle
& Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 724 n.20, 677 P.2d 1147, 1169 n.20, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870, 892 n.20 (Bird,
J., dissenting) (approval of warning language by FDA not necessarily dispositive of state law
failure-to-warn claim); MacDonald,394 Mass. at 136, 475 N.E.2d at 70 (liability for failure to
warn not necessarily avoided by manufacturer's compliance with FDA guidelines); Feldman v.
Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 446, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984) (state law claim based on
strict liability not preempted by federal regulation of drug industry). But see Moore v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 676 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. La.) (FDA approval effectively preempted
consumer tort law claim under state law), modified, 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1987). For a
thoughtful analysis of the preemption problem, see Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the Food and Drug Administration, 41 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 233 (1986).
A second argument is that compliance with governmental regulation should suffice to preclude
liability as a matter of law. This argument is usually rejected on the ground that compliance
with statute or regulation is merely evidence of non-negligence but not dispositive with respect
to the issue. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C (1965); MUPLA, supra note 20, § 108,
at 44; cases cited in note 209 supra.
222 See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 45, 53 (1973) (FDA warnings may be only minimal in nature); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 270 Or. 375, 398, 528 P.2d 522, 534 (1974) (mere compliance with FDA
demands does not necessarily satisfy requirement of appropriate warnings); Bristol-Myers v.
Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (warning's mere compliance with FDA
requirements not adequate as matter of law), rev'd on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.
1978). For a critique of this approach, see Walsh & Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal Regulation and State Tort Law Drug Regulation, 41 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 171 (1986).
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ment, but rather the totality of possible warnings for the product or
product type.223 Accordingly, a dose of judicial humility is called for.
Courts recognizing the limits of their institutional capabilities should refuse to second-guess the judgments of agencies who possess not only expertise but also a capacity for knowledge and memory which the courts
cannot match. If the regulation aims at reducing the particular risk that

materialized in the plaintiff's injury, the fact that a warning conforms to
a regulation promulgated by a federal agency should practically foreclose

liability for failure to warn. In those instances, courts should require
plaintiffs to show by clear and convincing evidence that the agency's reg-

ulation was insufficient. 224
In one class of failure-to-warn cases, the courts appear to have followed something like the agency-deference approach suggested here.

The federal courts of appeal, in the recent spate of cigarette-cancer cases,
have effectively eliminated all failure-to-warn actions arising subsequent

to 1966, when the Federal Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act 225
became effective. Admittedly, the cases have been decided under the
guise of federal preemption of states' rights to regulate warnings. 226
223 See text accompanying notes 151-55 supra.
224 Several states have enacted legislation providing that compliance with state or federal
statutes or regulations creates a rebuttable presumption that a product is non-defective. See,
e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(b) (1977); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3304 (1981); NJ. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:58C-1(4) (West 1987); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.1 to -05(3) (1979); Tenn. Code § 29-28104 (1978). Some have passed statutes providing that compliance with FDA warnings bars the
assessment of punitive damages. See, eg., NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-1(5) (West 1987); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.80(c) (1987); 1987 Or. Laws ch. 774, § 3; Tex. Civ. Prc. & Rem. Code
Ann. § 81.003 (Vernon 1987). Several noted scholars have advocated that compliance with
statutory or regulatory warnings be considered an absolute defense to liability. See, eg., R.
Epstein, supra note 9, at 110-12; Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale LJ. 353, 398 n.90 (1988). Given the lack of structure and the openendedness of the failure-to-warn doctrine, we believe that greater credence must be given to
governmental standards than is now the case. We do not agree with those states that have
instituted the rebuttable presumption because we believe that it does not give sufficient guidance to courts in deciding whether to take cases from the jury. Regardless of whether there is
such a presumption, the plaintiff succeeds if he shows by a preponderance of the evidence that
the standard to which the defendant's product conforms is inadequate. The problem, as we
suggest, is the evidentiary standard, not the entity on whom the burden of proof is placed.

Thus, to give the presumption any weight, a higher standard than mere preponderance is required. It does not follow, however, that an irrebuttable presumption is the appropriate solution to the problem. Our position thus steers a middle course between the two extremes.
225 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982).
226 See, eg., Roysdon v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 233-35 (6th Cir. 1988)
(failure-to-warn claim preempted by federal law); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d
312, 313 (11th Cir. 1987) (preemption occurs by implication when federal law occupies field,
leaving no room for local supplementation); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181,
186-88 (3d Cir. 1986) (Act preempted state law claims challenging adequacy of warning on
cigarette packages), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1043 (1987); Forster v. R. . Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
437 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1989) (federal act impliedly prempts state law failure-to-warn
claims); Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 225 NJ. Super. 375, 381, 542 A.2d
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However, as commentators have noted, the federal preemption argument
does not follow easily from controlling precedent. 227 The more logical
explanation is that the courts are convinced that the litigation cycle that
would follow from a contrary holding would be unmanageable. The
specter of trial courts making findings of inadequacy based on the failure
of defendants to have added small increments of warnings to those legislatively mandated is one that the appellate courts do not welcome. The
prospect of such increments effectively being mandated on a state-bystate basis is equally unappealing to courts. 228 We believe that the holdings in these cases are rather the product of common sense or common
law preemption than that of federal preemption.
In addition to legislative deference, courts should accord some
weight to industry standards regarding product warnings. Defendants
have put forward industry custom as a defense in failure-to-warn litiga229
tion less frequently than compliance with governmental standards.
Courts have good reason, of course, to be more suspect of the custom
defense simply because it may be in the interest of industry to conform to
a sub-optimal standard of care. Nonetheless, widespread industry custom with regard to product warnings deserves serious attention by the
courts. Once again, an entire industry has the ability to assess the warning issue in a manner that a court faced with seriatim litigation cannot
hope to accomplish. We do not suggest that a black letter rule of judicial
deference to industry-wide standards be adopted. We do argue that
courts should give substantial weight to evidence that an entire industry,
or a substantial portion thereof, has chosen to handle product warnings
in a certain way.
C. Injecting ProceduralRigor: Some Starch and Some Tension
We have argued that failure-to-warn litigation lacks the kind of
healthy adversarial tension that calls upon decisionmakers to struggle
with the cases they decide. It remains to be considered whether the
needed tension may be injected by adjusting the processes by which these
919, 922 (1988) (federal act preempted claim alleging failure to warn).
227 See, e.g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-26, at 490-91, § 6-27, at 497 (2d ed.
1988); Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy and Alternative
Compensation System, 39 Syracuse L. Rev. 897, 924-39 (1988).
228 See, e.g., Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627 (Ist Cir. 1987) (it is inconceivable that Congress intended views of single state or single state jury to supercede national
interests); Forster,437 N.W.2d at 659 (if state claims allowed, state-imposed regulatory scheme
effectively will be superimposed on federal scheme).
229 See, e.g., Marchant v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 836 F.2d 695, 699 n.2 (lst Cir. 1988)
(industry-wide custom not to provide warning admissible but not controlling); Dunn v. Wixom
Bros., 493 So. 2d 1356, 1360 (Ala. 1986) (custom not to provide warning admissible but not
controlling).
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claims are brought to trial.
L

Increased Utilization of Experts

An earlier discussion observed that expert witnesses play a less important role in failure-to-warn litigation than in litigation involving allegedly defective product designs.230 With respect to design, it is almost
inconceivable that a case involving any significant complexity would be
tried without both sides relying heavily on experts.2 1 The expert testimony could be expected more often than not to be rigorous, reflecting
confidence in its conclusions. 23 2 In contrast, courts have made clear that

experts are not required in connection with the issue of whether the defendant supplied adequate warnings of product-related risks, 233 even

when the case involves complex technology. 234 This reasoning generates
a dangerous asymmetry, because plaintiffs often choose to rely on experts

in warnings cases.23 And although it is often the case that the expert
testimony relates to whether the defendant reasonably should have
known of the risks not warned of,-3 6 or to the technical background
describing the risk and its non-obvious qualities 237 (in which cases warnings experts tend to show the same rigor as they display in design
cases), 23 s in a large percentage of failure-to-warn cases the main function
of plaintiffs' experts is to offer speculative and conclusory opinions that
230 See text accompanying note 141 supra.

231 See generally J. Henderson & A. Twerski, supra note 88, at 639-46 (noting, Inter alia,
that expert testimony is required in design-defect cases to show alternative design feasibility).
232 We do not argue that expert testimony in design cases is free of difficulties. See authorities cited in note 164 supra. The point is that expert testimony ought to play at least something close to the role in failure-to-warn litigation that it now plays in design-defect cases.
233 See, e.g., Marchant,836 F.2d at 701 ("Few questions are 'more appropriately left to a
common sense lay judgment than that of whether a written warning gets its message across to
an average person."' (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1293, 1304
(D.D.C. 1982))); Cocco v. Deluxe Systems, Inc., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 154, 516 N.F2d 1171,
1174 (1987) (ury competent to decide adequacy of warning without expert testimony even if
relevant technology is complex).
234 See Cocco, 25 Mass. App. Ct. at 154, 516 N.F-2d at 1174.
235 See, e.g., Long v. Deere & Co., 238 Kan. 766, 775-76, 715 P.2d 1023, 1031 (1986);
Downie v. Kent Prods., 122 Mich. App. 722, 732, 333 N.W.2d 528, 533 (1983); Rego Co. v.
Brannon, 682 S.W.2d 677, 680-81 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).

236 See, eg., Outlaw v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 770 F.2d 1012, 1013-14 (1 Ith Cir.
1985); Dartez v. Fibrebroad Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 469 (5th Cir. 1985); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1496 (D.NJ. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 883 F. 2d 541
(3d Cir. 1990).
237 See, e.g., Schneider v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 150 Ariz. 153, 160-61, 722 P.2d 321, 328-29
(1985); Kroger Say-On Store v. Presnel, 515 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. CL App. 1987).
238 In a manner of speaking, these cases address the "design aspects" of warnings claims.
Occasionally, defendants object that this sort of testimony only relates to the design issue,
leaving the failure-to-warn claim unsupported by proof. See, e.g., Rego Co., 682 S.W.2d at
680.
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the warnings supplied by defendants were inadequate. 239 While some
courts object to this use of experts in warnings litigation, 240 a greater
number approve. 24 1
These patterns must change. Whenever expert testimony would
help jurors to assess the validity of a failure-to-warn claim, judges should
require both sides to support their arguments regarding obviousness, sufficiency, and causation with testimony from qualified experts who give

more than conclusory opinions that warnings are or are not adequate, or
that better warnings would or would not have made a difference. We are

urging, in effect, that courts pressure litigants to develop more adequate
behavioral models with which to sort out valid and invalid warnings

claims. At the same time, courts should eschew reliance on the uninformed discourse that currently dominates warnings litigation. Juries are
competent to judge some issues on their own, and should be left to do so.
On balance, we would like to see more, rather than less, expert testimony

in these cases. But, in any case, courts must insist that it be rigorous.
At a time when the role of experts in products litigation generally
has come under heavy attack, 242 it may seem odd to insist that behavioral
experts be utilized more frequently. Indeed, our own analysis has suggested that expert testimony can be especially problematic in the failureto-warn context.243 However, in an area so devoid of substance and so

overblown with mere posturing, judicial insistence that experts speak
with greater authority makes considerable sense. As we have observed,
the sciences relevant to warnings claims are softer than those that inform
decisions regarding allegedly defective designs. 244 However, experts
could serve to educate the courts as to the truly difficult policy choices
239 See, e.g., Ponder v. Warren Tool Corp., 834 F.2d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1987); Salvi v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 140 Ill. App. 3d 896, 903-04, 489 N.E.2d 394, 399 (1986); Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Battle, 745 S.W.2d 909, 914 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
240 See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 434, 581 P.2d 271, 279 (1978);
Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft, 361 Pa. Super. 137, 151, 522 A.2d 52, 59
(1987).
241 See cases cited in note 141 supra; see also Annotation, Products Liability: Admissibility
of Expert or Opinion Evidence as to Adequacy of Warning Provided to User of Product, 26
A.L.R. 4th 377 (1983) (compiling products liability cases determining admissibility of expert
evidence concerning adequacy of warning).
242 See, e.g., Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 643-45 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that lay jury should not be allowed to condemn entire industry
relying on unbelievable expert testimony). See generally Epstein & Klein, The Use and Abuse
of Expert Testimony in Products Liability Actions, 17 Seton Hall L. Rev. 656 (1987) (arguing
that courts should screen out self-annointed experts and unscientific testimony); Hoenig,
Drawing the Line on Expert Opinion, 8 J. Prod. Liab. 335 (1985) (suggesting guidelines for
limiting abuse of expert testimony in products litigation).
243 See notes 138-41 and accompanying text supra.
244 See text accompanying note 130 supra.
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that attend this special genre of products litigation.2 45 Courts could insist, on threat of dismissal of actions, that plaintiffs bring forth the relevant expertise. And they could insist, on threat of giving cases to juries
on instructions favorable to plaintiffs, that defendants respond in kind.
In this area of the law, adding expertise to the evidentiary mix at trial
could be a real blessing.
2.

Elimination of Causation Presumptions

We showed above how a presumption of proximate causation cannot be derived logically from comment j to section 402A of the Restatement. 246 Now we argue that such a presumption makes no good sense on

the merits. In failure-to-warn cases, causation analysis is already a flight
into fancy. When a presumption favors the plaintiff, the defendant is

basically precluded from the opportunity to convince a court to rule as a
matter of law that the failure to warn was not the proximate cause of
plaintiff's harm. 247 In some instances, giving the plaintiff the benefit of
the doubt regarding causation is fair to both sides. For example, when
the victim is killed in an accident with respect to which there are no

eyewitnesses, and it is clear that a reasonable person in the decedent's
position probably would have read and heeded the missing warning, allowing a jury to conclude that the decedent would have heeded an adequate warning is appropriate.2" However, when all the circumstantial
evidence (save the plaintiff's self-serving testimony) points the other way,
245 For example, we envisage that experts with "decision-theory" expertise could contribute
to the sophisticaion of failure-to-warn litigation. For a description of the experimental work
by these scholars, see authorities cited in notes 174-76 supra.
246 See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra.
247 With rare exception, the causation question is considered to be a jury issue. See, e.g.,
Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1499 (D. Kan. 1987) (whether presumption of decision causation is rebutted in case of inadequate warnings to parent that DPT can
cause brain damage is fact question for jury); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180
Ind. App. 33, 56-57, 388 N.E.2d 541, 557 (1979) (whether presumption ofdecision causation is
rebutted where physician was not adequately warned of risk of thrombophlebitis arising from
oral contraceptive is jury question); Holley v. Burroughs Welcome Co., 318 N.C. 352, 360-61,
348 S.E.2d 772, 777 (1986) (whether doctor relied on inadequate warning that anesthetic can
cause malignant hypothermia is jury question). But see Plummer v. Lederle Laboratories, 819
F.2d 349, 356-58 (2d Cir.) (no evidence that physician would have warned patient of risk of
contracting polio from vaccine; thus, if warning was adequate, no proximate cause as matter of
law), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987); Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 850-51 (La. 1987)
(failure to warn adequately in driver's manual about intense heat emanating from catalytic
converter not cause of fire because owner said he never read manual; presumption of causation
rebutted).
248 See, e.g., Cohen v. St. Regis Paper Co., 109 A.D.2d 1048, 487 N.Y.S.2d 406 (plaintiff's
decedent suffocated from carbon dioxide fumes from dry ice; although there were no eyewitnesses and decedents fellow employees testified that decedent had been warned, court held
that issue of proximate cause was jury question), aff'd, 65 N.Y.2d 752, 481 N.E.2d 562, 492
N.Y.S.2d 22 (1985).
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shifting the burden to the defendant prevents a court from disposing of
even a patently weak claim as a matter of law. 249 Because the defendant
must prove that her failure to warn was not the cause of injury, the court
is almost duty-bound to send virtually every proximate causation issue,
no matter how weak the factual basis, to the jury for determination. If
we truly seek an active judicial role in controlling the kinds of warnings
cases that reach the jury, the causation presumption must be abandoned
25 0
in favor of a more fact-intensive approach.
CONCLUSION

In the branch of products liability commentary devoted to generically dangerous products, much attention has been paid in recent years
to liability for defective product designs. In contrast, failure-to-warn litigation has largely escaped serious analysis. Almost everyone appears to
have assumed that traditional negligence doctrine is adequate to the task
of deciding warnings cases. Breaking ranks with the majority of commentators, we argue that negligence doctrine in the context of failure-towarn litigation is little more than an empty shell. In most cases, the
elements of the warnings cause of action require plaintiffs to do little
more than mouth empty phrases. From the plaintiff's perspective, there
is undoubtedly a certain attractiveness to a tort without a meaningful
standard of care or any serious requirement of proving causation. From
a broader social perspective, however, such a tort is too lawless to be fair
or useful.
To cure this collapse of failure-to-warn doctrine, we urge that judges
engage more aggressively in both lawmaking and law-applying. We have
considered the possibility of replacing the nonfeasance-oriented failureto-warn regime with a misfeasance-oriented system of misrepresentationbased liability. Perhaps if the judicial climate today were, as it was a
decade ago, firmly committed to expanding products liability wherever
possible, we would recommend that such a drastic change be implemented by statute. However, we perceive that judges today may be more
receptive to arguments of the sort we are making.
If this perception is accurate, and if we have fairly and persuasively
249 See, e.g., Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1989) (plaintiff injured while being
towed behind motor boat in inner tube at very high speed; court recognized presumption that
warning would have been heeded by plaintiff and affirmed judgment for plaintiff based on jury
finding that defendant's failure to warn contributed to causing accident); see also Gershonowitz, The Strict Liability Duty to Warn, 44 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 71, 95-106 (1987)
(emphasizing the role of materiality and causation as crucial to limiting failure-to-warn

doctrine).
25 See Raney v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 897 F.2d 94, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1990) (plaintiff not enti-

tled to causation presumption, but "causation may sometimes be inferred from the facts and
circumstances .... ").
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presented the shortcomings in current failure-to-warn doctrine, perhaps
courts will respond generally with good sense and moderation. If they
do not, legislation along the lines of our analysis may yet be called for. It
is imperative that failure-to-warn litigation become subject to the rule of
law. Talk is cheap, but courts must recognize that the education of consumers through product warnings is not. For too long these easy cases
have made bad law. The time for change has come.
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